Location Choice and Patent Licensing*

Abstract

This paper studies the patent licensing decision when firms can endogenously choose their locations. If the insider patentee is the location leader, the royalty is not necessarily the best method of licensing. No licensing can be the best method for an insider patentee with a sufficiently high degree of innovation, but fixed-fee is always the worst. However, if the non-innovating firm is the location leader, the royalty licensing is always the best method; moreover, the fixed-fee licensing (no licensing) is the second best method if the degree of innovation is relatively small (sufficiently large).

The Evaluation of an Environmental Regime in Taiwan’s Adhesive Tape Manufacturing Industry

“…The technology licensing issue has been extended into many various fields, such as when the technology licensing occurs in an open economy (Mukherjee, 2007;Chang, 2011), an innovator licenses a new technology about product quality (Li & Song, 2009), the technology licensing occurs in vertical market structure (Brocas, 2003;Matsushima, 2004;Buehler & Schmutzler, 2007), using the spatial competition model to discuss the technology licensing (Poddar & Sinha, 2004;Lin et al, 2012), and the technology licensing occurs when the number of licensee is extended to n firms, where n  3 (Kamien & Tauman, 2002;Sen, 2005). A few technology licensing papers touch upon the environmental protection issue.…”

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