Localization and Corruption: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?

Gurgur, Tugrul; Shah, Anwar

doi:10.1596/1813-9450-3486

“…All these affect the socio-cultural and political value of the country's residents that affect the corruption inversely. These findings are supported by the previous empirical findings of Kunicova-R.Ackerman (2005), Gurgur-Shah (2005), Ali-Isse (2003), Knack-Azfar (2003), , Ades-Di Tella (1999), Treisman (2000, Paldam (2002-01) and etc. We also performed sensitivity analysis by dropping the variable one by one in the form of equation 2 and 3.…”

Section: Empirical Findingssupporting

confidence: 89%

“…The positive relation between corruption and income distribution is supported by the findings of Paldam (2002) and, Amanullah and Eatzaz (2007). A negative relation between trade openness/economic integration and level of corruption is strongly recommended by various studies like; Gurgur-Shah (2005), Brunetti-Weder (2003) and Knack-Azfar (2003) where as a positive relation between these two is also supported by the findings of Graeff-Mehlkop (2003) and Paldam (2001).…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Derivationmentioning

confidence: 70%

Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries

Chaudhry¹,

Shabbir²

2022

pdr

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries

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“…The model takes its starting point in Shleifer and Vishny (1993), but differs in that the officials are exploited by the 6 Similar to our findings, Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that competition among officials reduces corruption at the lower level of government. This is also supported by Gurgur and Shah (2000) in a cross-country analysis. However, we show that it can actually be selected by a corrupt central authority to increase its revenues and that this choice is a function of the structure of the judiciary.…”

supporting

confidence: 65%

Judiciaries in corrupt societies

Priks

¹

2010

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may JUDICIARIES IN CORRUPT SOCIETIES AbstractRecent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption. We provide empirical evidence which is in line with this result.JEL Code: H11, K40.

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“…The economic factors include the economic development level measured by GDP per capita and the degree of marketization expressed by the extent of economic freedom and the openness of trade (e.g., Ades and Di Tella, 1999;Gurger and Shah, 2005). In addition, official development aid (ODA) and public works are regarded as factors that trigger corruption because these policies tend to foster a cozy relationship between political and business circles (e.g., Ali and Isse, 2003;Dreher et al, 2004).…”

Section: Literature Review and Remaining Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%