Local Powers and a Distant State in Rural Central African Republic

Abstract

T  situation described by this statemen, often heard in the Central African Republic, seems to conform to the objectives of the currently fashionable policies of decentralisation and structural adjustment-for example, to end ' too much state '. However, the absence of the state in the rural areas of the CAR is so striking that the position in certain respects has almost reached the level of caricature. It also reflects the more general situation in other parts of the continent where the excesses of a centralised, over-staffed post-colonial re! gime can coexist perfectly with the pronounced absence in the rural areas of certain functions which are commonly supposed to be provided by the state, including basic administration and justice, as well as social, educational, and health services. This absence of the state does not mean that a void exists in its place. Local life may suffer from under-administration, but still be characterised by often latent and disguised greed, conflicts, and negotiation between various authorities, clans, and factions. This means that the study of local powers and politics must not be restricted to ' formal ' institutions but ought also to take account of all ' public spaces ' and positions of eminence. The protagonists and stakes involved are, therefore, visible and official to a greater or lesser extent, and always significant in number. This gives rise to complex political configurations which vary from one area, culture, and country to the next. Thus, due to historical factors, the fluidity and weak institutionalisation of most forms of jurisdiction are particularly marked in the CAR, although here can also be found the ' polycephaly ' and multiplicity of local ' power poles ' that exist elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa." This article is the outcome of research undertaken in the west and

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