2013
DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2012.707682
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Local Political Corruption: Potential structural malfunctions at the central–local, local–local and intra-local levels

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Cited by 41 publications
(48 citation statements)
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References 55 publications
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“…However, there is widespread agreement among the public that political corruption is the abuse of power for private gain. Furthermore, the exact meaning of this notion is consistent with the so‐called conventional conception of political corruption (Beeri and Navot ). Put differently, what makes the issue of political corruption hard to detect is not its elusive definition, but rather its hidden nature.…”
Section: Political Corruption In Israelsupporting
confidence: 74%
“…However, there is widespread agreement among the public that political corruption is the abuse of power for private gain. Furthermore, the exact meaning of this notion is consistent with the so‐called conventional conception of political corruption (Beeri and Navot ). Put differently, what makes the issue of political corruption hard to detect is not its elusive definition, but rather its hidden nature.…”
Section: Political Corruption In Israelsupporting
confidence: 74%
“…Many local interviewees commented that the former mayor instigated the shuttering of the state‐owned porcelain factories in lieu of reconstituting them as more viable state‐owned enterprises. The public perceived this as a combination of structural and individual corruption (given that the mayor benefitted personally), which differs from the findings of Beeri and Navot (), indicating that corruption at the local government level is structural and not individual (based on a quantitative survey in Israel).…”
Section: Government Interventions Vs Public Expectationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, eventually, some local stakeholders may lose access to decision making. Moreover, replacing formal hierarchies with abstract norms could lead to corruption, as broad networks diffuse the lines of accountability and control (Beeri and Navot 2012).…”
Section: New Localismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Because neither inspection nor recovery plans guarantee full recovery (Beeri 2013a;Beeri and Navot 2013;McKiernan 2003;Snape and Taylor 2000), as a last resort, central governments may merge local authorities or may take the final, most severe measure: dismantling the local leadership by dismissing elected officials (e.g., the mayor and council members) and transferring their powers and responsibilities to a committee convened on behalf of the government (Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2009; Grubnic and Woods 2009;Stoker 2004b). Only a few democratic countries employ this neutralization approach; those that do include Ireland, Iceland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Israel (Beeri 2013a;Joumard and Kongsrud 2003).…”
Section: Central Interventions Toward Failing Localitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%