Local Load Redistribution Attacks in Power Systems With Incomplete Network Information

Li, Xuan; Li, Zuyi

doi:10.1109/tsg.2013.2291661

Cited by 236 publications

(104 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Furthermore, these approaches only considered that the attacker has complete knowledge of power system. According to a recent research of Rahman et al [13] and Liu et al [14], the attacker's knowledge may be limited.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protection Strategies Against False Data Injection Attacks with Uncertain Information on Electric Power Grids

Bae¹,

Lee²,

Kim³

et al. 2017

Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology

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-False data injection attacks have recently been introduced as one of important issues related to cyber-attacks on electric power grids. These attacks aim to compromise the readings of multiple power meters in order to mislead the operation and control centers. Recent studies have shown that if a malicious attacker has complete knowledge of the power grid topology and branch admittances, s/he can adjust the false data injection attack such that the attack remains undetected and successfully passes the bad data detection tests that are used in power system state estimation. In this paper, we investigate that a practical false data injection attack is essentially a cyber-attack with uncertain information due to the attackers lack of knowledge with respect to the power grid parameters because the attacker has limited physical access to electric facilities and limited resources to compromise meters. We mathematically formulated a method of identifying the most vulnerable locations to false data injection attack. Furthermore, we suggest minimum topology changes or phasor measurement units (PMUs) installation in the given power grids for mitigating such attacks and indicate a new security metrics that can compare different power grid topologies. The proposed metrics for performance is verified in standard IEEE 30-bus system. We show that the robustness of grids can be improved dramatically with minimum topology changes and low cost.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protection Strategies Against False Data Injection Attacks with Uncertain Information on Electric Power Grids

Bae¹,

Lee²,

Kim³

et al. 2017

Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology

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“…This is because in practice it is very difficult for an attacker with limited budget to have this information since: (1) most power grids have thousands of buses and lines; and (2) power grid data are strongly protected. Unfortunately, we have proven that an attacker is able to construct an undetectable attack vector z " H∆θ with incomplete network information [14]. This is done by ensuring that all boundary buses in the attacking region connected to the same non-attacking region have the same incremental phase angle.…”

Section: Review Of False Data Injection Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The injected false data ∆D is summed to zero in Equation (7) and the attacking amount at a load bus ∆D d is limited by constraint Equation (8). Corresponding Lagrangian multipliers are assigned for power balance in Equation (10), line flow constraint Equation (11), and lower and upper bound constraints of generation in Equation (12), line flow in Equation (13), and load shedding in Equation (14). Figure 1 summarizes the bilevel model for assessing the risk of one transmission line.…”

Section: Mathematical Formulation Of the Bilevel Attack Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this section, we provide the solution to the bilevel optimization problem Equations (3)- (14). One of the most popular methods used to solve a bilevel optimization problem is the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) based reformulation approach, in which the lower level is replaced with its KKT optimality constraints.…”

Section: Solution To the Bilevel Risk Assessment Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This might be beneficial to a defender. However, our previous work [14] revealed that the strong condition can be relaxed. In fact, an attacker only needs to obtain the network information of the attacking region to construct an undetectable attack vector based on KCL and KVL.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Cyber Risk Assessment of Transmission Lines in Smart Grids

Liu

Li³

2015

Energies

Self Cite

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Abstract:The increasing use of information technologies in power systems has increased the risk of power systems to cyber-attacks. In this paper, we assess the risk of transmission lines being overloaded due to cyber-based false data injection attacks. The cyber risk assessment is formulated as bilevel optimization problems that determine the maximum line flows under false data injection attacks. We propose efficient techniques to reduce the computation complexity of solving the bilevel problems. Specifically, primary and secondary filtering techniques are employed to identify the lines whose flows will never exceed their limits, which can significantly reduce computation burden. A special feasibility cut-based acceleration technique is introduced to further reduce the computation burden. The simulation results on the IEEE 30-bus, IEEE 118-bus, IEEE 300-bus and IEEE 2383-bus systems verify the proposed risk assessment model and the effectiveness of the proposed filtering and acceleration techniques.

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Tri‐level defense strategy for electricity‐gas integrated systems against load redistribution attacks

Fan

Tong

2021

Int Trans Electr Energ Syst

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Local Load Redistribution Attacks in Power Systems With Incomplete Network Information

Cited by 236 publications

References 10 publications

Protection Strategies Against False Data Injection Attacks with Uncertain Information on Electric Power Grids

Protection Strategies Against False Data Injection Attacks with Uncertain Information on Electric Power Grids

Cyber Risk Assessment of Transmission Lines in Smart Grids

Tri‐level defense strategy for electricity‐gas integrated systems against load redistribution attacks

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