Local Governments in the Wake of Demographic Change: Evidence from German Municipalities

Geys, Benny; Heinemann, Friedrich; Kalb, Alexander

doi:10.1628/001522108x397642

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Aging and shrinking populations present new challenges to local policymakers (Geys et al, 2008). Nonetheless, municipalities are legally required to provide certain services and are thus limited in their maneuverability in the allocation of a set of resources among mandated activities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Efficiency in Child-Care Provision

Montén¹,

Thater²

2011

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We analyze the efficiency of the municipal provision of child care and identify the main determinants of inefficiency. A unique data set on child-care expenditures and school readiness in the eastern German state of Saxony allows us to control for possible differences in quality across municipalities. First, we measure the efficiency using data envelopment analysis. We find substantial efficiency differences; the median municipality is up to 28% inefficient. Second, we identify the determinants of inefficiency in a bootstrapped truncated regression. Explanatory variables, such as an uncompensated mayor or a larger share of over-65-year-olds, significantly increase inefficiency.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Efficiency in Child-Care Provision

Montén¹,

Thater²

2011

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“…The reason lies in the fact that such reforms and particularly municipal mergers often aim at increasing the efficiency in local public good provision by increasing the size of local governments (Geys et al 2008). However, since political participation has recently been shown to have a beneficial influence on public…”

Section: Concluding Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

David and Goliath in the Poll Booth: Group Size, Voting Power and Voter Turnout

2015

Self Cite

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis article analyses how the presence of a dominant group of voters within the electorate affects voter turnout. Theoretically, we argue that both the absolute size and the relative power of a dominant group influence voters' decision-making process. The former effect derives from increased free-riding incentives and reduced social pressure to vote within a larger dominant group, while the latter effect is driven by instrumental and expressive responses-in both the dominant and dominated groups-to electoral competition between groups. Our empirical analysis of a large cross-section of German municipalities confirms this joint importance of a dominant group's absolute and relative size for voter turnout. Such effects should thus be taken into account when redesigning electoral jurisdictions through, for instance, municipal mergers or gerrymandering.

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“…Due to the design of the fiscal equalization scheme, this variable determines the fiscal endowment of municipalities to a large extent. In addition, the total population has often been found to be connected with the level of expenditures for different reasons (e.g., scale effects in public goods provision (Geys et al )). The variable (per‐capita) County‐level gross domestic product (GDP) captures municipal expenditure variations driven by the effects of the overall economic situation on revenue.…”

Section: Data and Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Self‐Preserving Leviathans Evidence from Local‐Level Data

Kluge

Markwardt²,

Thater

2017

Kyklos

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Summary This paper investigates the impact of the intensity of political competition on the leviathan behavior of local politicians. While we find only weak effects of strong parties on total expenditures and, thus, only weak traces of standard leviathan behavior, we find strong evidence that the spending pattern during a legislative period depends on the distribution of power in local councils. In municipalities with weak political competition, the public spending reaches a peak in election years. If parties face politically strong opponents, they do not initiate a political budget cycle. Our results indicate that local politicians act as self‐preserving leviathans.

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Local Governments in the Wake of Demographic Change: Evidence from German Municipalities

Cited by 11 publications

References 8 publications

Determinants of Efficiency in Child-Care Provision

Determinants of Efficiency in Child-Care Provision

David and Goliath in the Poll Booth: Group Size, Voting Power and Voter Turnout

Self‐Preserving Leviathans Evidence from Local‐Level Data

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