Local Energy Efficiency Policy Implementation in China: Bridging the Gap between National Priorities and Local Interests

Abstract

This paper analyses Chinese sub-national governments' implementation strategies to meet national energy efficiency targets in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006. Previous research has focused on the ways governance practices and decision-making structures shape implementation outcomes, yet very little attention has been given to what strategies local leaders actually employ to bridge national priorities with local interests. To illustrate how local leaders work politically, this paper highlights specific implementation methods officials use to strengthen formal incentives and create effective informal incentives to comply with energy efficiency mandates. The analysis is drawn from 53 interviews conducted in June and July of 2010 in Shanxi, a major coal-producing and energy-intensive province. Findings suggest that local government leaders conform to national directives by "bundling" the energy efficiency policy with policies of more pressing local importance or by "bundling" their energy efficiency objectives with the interests of groups with significant political influence. Ultimately, sub-national government officials frame policies in ways that give them legitimacy at the local level.

Governing China’s Clean Energy Transition: Policy Reforms, Flexible Implementation and the Need for Empirical Investigation

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“…Such energy-saving measures included cutting electricity to hospitals, homes, and rural villages. During the last quarter of the 11th FYP, local governments also used "sleeping management" (xiumian guanli ) to temporarily shut energy-intensive companies (Kostka and Hobbs 2012;Harrison and Kostka 2014). Such drastic 11th-hour practices illustrate that some local leaders choose the path of least resistance in selecting short-term, low-quality approaches to satisfying environmental targets and, while nominally following green directives, are actually putting off the difficult business of changing lanes.…”

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