Lobbying or Information Provision

Sukiassyan, Grigor; Nugent, Jeffrey B.

doi:10.2753/eee0012-8775490202

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Exploring primarily firm outcomes they find that association membership increases not only sales growth but also growth in exports and R&D. Most importantly they discover that lobbying has the smallest effect on firm outcomes, with other association benefits such as product market information and accreditation standards being more salient. Like previous studies they find that bribe payments do not affect firm performance (Sukiassyan & Nugent, 2011).…”

Section: Business Associations and Lobby Groups: Theory And Evidencesupporting

confidence: 50%

Lobbying, Corruption, and Regulatory Constraints: An Analysis of Eastern European Business Associations

Kiselev

2013

SSRN Journal

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This paper examines lobbying and corruption as alternative ways of dealing with regulatory obstacles. I propose a model where firms facing a costly regulation can bribe a rule-enforcing bureaucrat to get around it, lobby the government to reduce its impact, or do both. I then use a firm-level dataset of Eastern European enterprises to examine whether firms use membership in a lobby group as a substitute for the bribe payments they make to rule-enforcing bureaucrats. The results indicate that firms who join lobby groups do not stop paying bribes to bureaucrats, and firms more impacted by corruption are no more likely to join a lobby group than their counterparts. On the other hand joining a lobby group increases the likelihood of a firm bribing legislators and other rule makers, suggesting that lobbying introduces the possibility of state capture by allowing firms access to policy makers that they wouldn't otherwise have. * Eugene Kiselev is currently a PhD student at Brandeis University International Business School.

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Section: Business Associations and Lobby Groups: Theory And Evidencesupporting

confidence: 50%

Lobbying, Corruption, and Regulatory Constraints: An Analysis of Eastern European Business Associations

Kiselev

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…Lobbying is the preferred mobilization mechanism to influence policymakers among developed nations (see de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014;Harstad & Svensson, 2011;Naoi & Krauss, 2009) but is also prevalent in transitional economies (Sukiassyan & Nugent, 2011) and in the developing world (Campos & Giovannoni, 2007). Lobbying may imply an exchange that benefits an individual legislator, her constituency, or a wider sector of the population but also credible threats to withhold such benefits.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The influence of the fossil fuel and emission‐intensive industries on the stringency of mitigation policies: Evidence from the OECD countries and Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa

Stevens

2019

Env Pol Gov

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The article assesses the effects of different industrial sectors on the design of marketbased policies that mitigate climate change. It claims that the emission-intensive and fossil fuel industries, especially those exposed to trade, have a negative impact on the stringency of domestic market-based mitigation policies, namely, carbon taxes and Emission Trading Systems (ETS). To address endogeneity between industrial and policy outputs, the empirical analysis resorts to a nontraditional instrumental variable method constructing instruments with heteroskedastic errors in the data. With a dataset that covers 34 countries from 1990 to 2015, the analysis shows that there is a negative and statistically significant association between these industries and policy stringency, albeit in a differentiated way. Whereas the upstream fossil fuel industries have a negative relationship with carbon taxes, the power industry was only negatively associated with ETS. Emission-intensive manufacturers and the downstream fossil fuels industry have a negative effect on both policies. The design and practical applications of each policy explain the disparities; although ETS regulate larger emission-intensive installations such as power plants, carbon taxes tend to impose tariffs on activities that are not necessarily emission-intensive, such as oil extraction or specific fuels. The results, robust to different estimation methods, support that larger industrial outputs are significantly associated with less stringent mitigation policies.

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“…A widespread approach in the literature distinguishes between the beneficial, market-supporting and the harmful, rent-seeking role of BAs, the latter which is often associated with lobbying (Battisti − Perry, 2015;Duvanova, 2013;Marques, 2017;Sukiassyan − Nugent, 2011;Ville, 2007). We suggest that it is perhaps better to approach the issue starting with the understanding of BAs as institutions intended to further the goals of a business community.…”

Section: Business Associations As Rent-seekingmentioning

confidence: 98%

What do business associations do?

Molnár

2020

CJSSP

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This article provides a review of the literature on business associations (BAs) in line with the following questions: (1) What are the economic roles of BAs, (2) How are BAs institutionalized, and (3) What drives BAs to engage in socially beneficial or harmful activities? Challenging the popular distinction between beneficial, market-supporting and harmful, rent-seeking (lobbying) goals of BAs, we demonstrate that there are three major economic roles of BAs, all of which can involve activities linked to the private order and the public order, and all of which can be socially beneficial or harmful. We also challenge the proposition that institutional strength is needed for BAs to fulfil beneficial economic roles, highlighting that BAs have three main institutional functions, and the level of institutionalization of each of the functions can be different in relation to their beneficial economic roles. We suggest that whether BAs tend toward engage in in socially beneficial or harmful activities depends on their private-order and publicorder institutional limitations.

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Lobbying or Information Provision

Cited by 9 publications

References 15 publications

Lobbying, Corruption, and Regulatory Constraints: An Analysis of Eastern European Business Associations

Lobbying, Corruption, and Regulatory Constraints: An Analysis of Eastern European Business Associations

The influence of the fossil fuel and emission‐intensive industries on the stringency of mitigation policies: Evidence from the OECD countries and Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa

What do business associations do?

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