Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change: An Analysis of Federal Agency Rulemaking

Nelson, David J.; Yackee, Susan Webb

doi:10.1017/s0022381611001599

Cited by 121 publications

(108 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Although attention has been given to the nature and development of alliances that emerge between organized interests (Hojnacki, 1997(Hojnacki, , 1998Hula, 1999;Carpenter et al, 2004;Heaney, 2004;Leach and Sabatier, 2005;Holyoke, 2009), most researchers do not consider whether policy goals are shared by different advocates who are active on issues nor is much known about how frequently different types of interests directly oppose the efforts of others. And, with few exceptions (Nelson and Yackee, 2012;Heaney and Lorenz, 2013), little effort has been made to investigate how the alliances that do emerge affect policy outcomes.…”

Section: Who Wants What and Who Wins?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When one type of interestorganizational or government, business or citizen -realizes its policy goals, it is important to know who else shared their objectives (for example, were there powerful or influential allies, was there consensus among several different interests) and who, if anyone, stood in opposition. A number of recent studies do in fact suggest that policy outcomes may be shaped by the characteristics of advocates who take an interest in a given policy issue; also significant is whether and to what extent those participants oppose or support one another's objectives (Baumgartner et al, 2009;McKay, 2012;Nelson and Yackee, 2012;Heaney and Lorenz, 2013;Gilens and Page, 2014). Relatedly, Salisbury et al (1987) show that the alliance and adversarial patterns that emerge in policy domains often are driven by the types of organized advocates involved in policy debates.…”

Section: Who Wants What and Who Wins?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Assessing business advantage in Washington lobbying

et al. 2015

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Popular accounts of business involvement in politics typically suggest that business interests enjoy relatively unfettered success in getting what they want from government. Scholarly work is more equivocal. In this article we use a random sample of 98 policy issues between 1998 and 2002 to examine whether business interests and other advocates get what they want from the policy process, and how their rate of success varies when they face different types of opponents. We find that business' efforts to affect public policy typically draw challenges from other types of interests. In the face of opposition, business is less likely relative to citizen interests to achieve its goals. But business does appear to have an advantage in the relatively rare instances when it acts to advance its interests on issues that do not draw opposition or interest from other actors. Under these circumstances, it is much more likely than other types of advocates who face no opposition to realize its policy goals. Our findings clarify how the nature and framing of issues and a favorable political climate can prove essential to business' prospects for achieving policy success.

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Section: Who Wants What and Who Wins?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Who Wants What and Who Wins?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing business advantage in Washington lobbying

et al. 2015

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“…Prior research suggests that interest groups join coalitions for resource-efficiency reasons (eg, Hula, 1999), as a result of cost-benefit analyses (eg, Hojnacki, 1997), or as part of a bargaining process where two conflicting groups choose to work together towards a new policy positions that satisfies them both (eg, Nelson and Webb Yackee, 2012). Distinguishing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 Gray and Lowery, 1998;Coen, 2004;Mahoney, 2007) However, our own study builds on these institutionally-informed studies in two particular ways.…”

Section: Findings and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lobbying coalitions are common -even ubiquitous -in Washington D.C. politics (eg, Nelson and Webb Yackee, 2012). They have also been identified as an increasingly frequent form of collective political action at the European Union (EU) level (eg, Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptions of institutional complexity and lobbyists' decisions to join lobbying coalitions – Evidence from the European Union context

Barron

Trouille

2015

Environ Plann C Gov Policy

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We use data from in-depth interviews with business lobbyists in Brussels to investigate why they choose to join lobbying coalitions. We find that lobbyists face two competing institutional incentives. First, they are confronted with incentives to ally with other European organisations, develop multilateral policy messages, and communicate messages to the Commission and the Parliament. Simultaneously, they face inducements to join narrower coalitions, develop bilateral policy messages, and direct those messages at the Council.Lobbyists' receptivity to these incentives -and thus their choices of lobbying coalitionsdiffers with their age, educational background, and with the type and ownership structure of the organisations they represent. Combined, our findings contribute to the limited, mainly American literature on interest coalitions by demonstrating that lobbyists operate in complex institutional environments, and that their interpretations of and reactions to institutional complexity are shaped by individual-and organisational-level factors.

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“…Social movements and grassroots advocacy coalitions also engage in political signaling [33]. Grassroots coalitions may shape the administrative law process with the understanding that lawmakers may make changes to it through ex post oversight.…”

Section: Political Signaling and Public Saliencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics of Race, Administrative Appeals, and Medicaid Disenrollment in Tennessee

Franklin

2017

Social Sciences

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Abstract:In 2004, Democratic Governor Philip Bredesen of Tennessee announced a plan to reform TennCare, the state's Medicaid program. The reform package proposed to remove 323,000 adults from the program, which represented the most drastic cuts to Medicaid since its creation in 1965. The reform measure also allowed beneficiaries disenrolled from the program to appeal the decisions to the state Department of Human Services. This study examines how race and policy backlash-that is the backlash against Medicaid expansion-influenced the appellate process for beneficiaries removed from the program in Tennessee. The main argument is that race-especially the predisposition of African Americans-influenced the outcome of the appellate proceedings. The theoretical framework advanced in this study explains how procedural deliberations (legal decisions, policy disputes, administrative hearings) exacerbate disparities and produce differential outcomes that correspond with racial and other ascriptive hierarchies. The data for this research, comprising more than 60,000 former TennCare beneficiaries, were obtained through Open Records Requests in compliance with Tennessee state law. Using logistic regressions, the findings reveal a relationship between race and appellate proceedings. African Americans were treated unfairly in the early stage of the appellate process and those from racially polarized voting areas were less likely to receive fair rulings by hearing examiners. Additional findings identified age-related disparities between younger and older appellants, as well as a regional disadvantage between rural and urban beneficiaries.

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Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change: An Analysis of Federal Agency Rulemaking

Cited by 121 publications

References 27 publications

Assessing business advantage in Washington lobbying

Assessing business advantage in Washington lobbying

Perceptions of institutional complexity and lobbyists' decisions to join lobbying coalitions – Evidence from the European Union context

The Politics of Race, Administrative Appeals, and Medicaid Disenrollment in Tennessee

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