Living the High Life in Minsk. Russian Energy Rents, Domestic Populism and Belarus’ Impending Crisis

Yakouchyk, Katsiaryna

doi:10.1080/09668136.2015.1087177

Cited by 2 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…This is highlighted in the long‐term impact of the Carter Doctrine (Krane & Medlock, 2018), protecting global oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. Disruptions with Russia raise the awareness of intermediaries and territoriality of energy supplies and the threat from those extracting rents along the chain (Balmaceda, 2014, 2021). The rise in electricity and gas prices was unexpected and unprecedented from a market and regulatory point of view.…”

Section: Discussion: the Return Of The Energy Weaponmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy as a weapon of war: Lessons from 50 years of energy interdependence

LaBelle

2023

Global Policy

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The Organization of the Petroleum‐Exporting Countries (OPEC) used oil as a weapon against Western countries supporting Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. From 2021, Russia used a similar strategy of restricting gas flows to Europe, while Europe later reduced Russia's market access. In these cases, there was economic and political damage. These examples show that energy is a weapon used to pressure sovereign states. Energy is a multidimensional resource that reflects broader ties within the political‐economic system of international relations. This comparative study identifies four components that enable energy as a weapon: interdependence, energy security, neoliberal economics and sovereignty. Four key policy lessons emerge to improve energy security: (1) determine the acceptable limits of energy dependence, (2) acknowledge institutions and markets cannot deliver energy security outside their design parameters, (3) energy security requires addressing the entire value chain, and (4) energy is a weapon that threatens state sovereignty. The collapse of the gas trade between Russia and the EU creates instability and removes the pillar of interdependency; this now ushers in a new era.

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Section: Discussion: the Return Of The Energy Weaponmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy as a weapon of war: Lessons from 50 years of energy interdependence

LaBelle

2023

Global Policy

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“…New impulses coming from the needs of Russian corporations, related to their domestic context (such as outdated domestic technology, as in the case of refining capacities unable to accommodate the needs of EU end consumers), as well as to their new international opportunities, have kept alive some old infrastructure relationships while also promoting new cross‐regional production chains, in some cases spanning the same spatial area as the inherited Soviet ones. For example, Belarus's important role in the Soviet system of oil refining and exports, further monetized in the post‐Soviet period, foreshadowed the country's interest in certain bilateral relationship forms with Russia which could help maintain—for example, by means of duty‐free supplies—this profitable role in the sale of refined oil products to the EU (Balmaceda, 2014). In a nod to discussions of “obsolescent bargains” (Vernon, 1971), it is important to note that the trans‐regional nature of these chains has to do not only with the chains themselves, but also with the way we look at regions: if the entire geographical span from Kamchatka to Prague was once considered a “region” for geopolitical reasons, this is no longer the case.…”

Section: Cross‐regional Production Chains Regio‐polarity and The Emer...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lukoil, Analyst Databook 2015, p. 35.2 Calculated from table 1 inHughes and Long (2015, p. 160).3 This was the case, for example, concerning Belarus in the late 1990s and early 2000s. For details seeBalmaceda (2014).4 This is in addition to petrol station networks outside geographical Europe.…”

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Cross‐Regional production chains, competitive regionalism, and the deepening of regulatory fault lines in Euro‐Asia

Balmaceda

Westphal²

2022

Review of Policy Research

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This article analyzes energy relations in the area encompassed by Russia, the EU, and their “common neighborhood” composed of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova through the lens of the interaction and tension between regionalism and regionalization. It investigates how the interaction between these two processes is reflected on the ground, and how the friction between institutionalized, from‐above integration (“regionalism”) may clash with the more bottom‐up process involving the “making” of regions through day‐to‐day infrastructural and production‐chain links (“regionalization”). Based on an analysis of trans‐regional production chains in the oil, natural gas, and electricity sectors, it hypothesizes that the competitive energy regionalisms we are observing in the EU‐Russia neighborhood (exemplified by the EU‐led European Energy Community and the Russia‐led Eurasian Economic Union mismatch with the underlying flows and production chains, with important economic and political implications.

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Living the High Life in Minsk. Russian Energy Rents, Domestic Populism and Belarus’ Impending Crisis

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Energy as a weapon of war: Lessons from 50 years of energy interdependence

Energy as a weapon of war: Lessons from 50 years of energy interdependence

Cross‐Regional production chains, competitive regionalism, and the deepening of regulatory fault lines in Euro‐Asia

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