Living Systems: Autonomy, Autopoiesis and Enaction

Villalobos, Mario; Ward, Dave

doi:10.1007/s13347-014-0154-y

Cited by 39 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…In the autopoietic theory (Maturana 1970(Maturana , 1975(Maturana , 1981(Maturana , 1987(Maturana , 2003Villalobos 2015) autonomy is a concept that appears in the description of living beings, but that is not assigned a central role. Nonetheless, the notions of organizational/operational closure and selfdetermination that underpin CE's concept of autonomy do appear in the autopoietic literature and play an important role (Villalobos and Ward 2015), as we shall now see.…”

Section: Enactive Anti-computationalism: Autonomy Self-determinationmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…The observer, of course, may still choose to treat the ambient air as something external to the system, but such a description is not justified based on the functional organization of the system alone. Maturana and Varela (1980), and more recently Villalobos (2015; see also Villalobos and Ward 2015), have argued that a living organism's sensorimotor system is organized as a functionally closed system, just like a thermostat with both components installed in the same house. The nervous system responds to the dynamics of its sensory organs by using its motor organs to establish a new environmental orientation, which in turn provokes a change to the dynamics of the sensory organs.…”

Section: Operational and Functional Closure: Circuits Without Inputs mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Enactive autonomy in computational systems

Villalobos

Dewhurst

2017

Synthese

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In this paper we will demonstrate that a computational system can meet the criteria for autonomy laid down by classical enactivism. The two criteria that we will focus on are operational closure and structural determinism, and we will show that both can be applied to a basic example of a physically instantiated Turing machine. We will also address the question of precariousness, and briefly suggest that a precarious Turing machine could be designed. Our aim in this paper is to challenge the assumption that computational systems are necessarily heteronomous systems, to try and motivate in enactivism a more nuanced and less rigid conception of computational systems, and to demonstrate to computational theorists that they might find some interesting material within the enactivist tradition, despite its historical hostility towards computationalism.

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Section: Enactive Anti-computationalism: Autonomy Self-determinationmentioning

confidence: 86%

Section: Operational and Functional Closure: Circuits Without Inputs mentioning

confidence: 99%

Enactive autonomy in computational systems

Villalobos

Dewhurst

2017

Synthese

Self Cite

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“…Not everyone has been convinced by these claims. Some theorists have pointed out that self-individuation does not appear sufficient for agency in this sense (Villalobos and Ward 2015). The general skepticism here can be traced back to Kant, who saw nonhuman organisms as active self-organising/self-sustaining systems but nonetheless regarded teleology as an epistemic ascription.…”

Section: The Case For the Ontology Of Enactive Agencymentioning

confidence: 97%

Thinking through enactive agency: sense-making, bio-semiosis and the ontologies of organismic worlds

Jesus

2018

Phenom Cogn Sci

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According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sensemaking agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: (i) there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence (ii) all organisms Bbring forth^their own unique Bworldst hrough processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: (i) these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they (ii) end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of (iii) a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds.

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“…The very fact of forming a causal circle seems to deeply divorce the autopoietic process from its environment. It thus does not come as a surprise that the apparent closed-off character of the autopoietic system or 'self' is a recurring theme in common readings of the theory, whether sympathetic or critical (e.g., Villalobos & Ward 2015, Pradeu 2012, 197ff., Swenson 1992. Is the autopoietic system, hence, just a substance wolf in process sheep's clothing?…”

Section: Biological Autonomy: the Improved Closure Thesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Autopoiesis, biological autonomy and the process view of life

Meincke

2018

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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In recent years, an increasing number of theoretical biologists and philosophers of biology have been opposing reductionist research agendas by appealing to the concept of biological autonomy which draws on the older concept of autopoiesis. In my paper, I investigate some of the ontological implications of this approach. The emphasis on autonomy and autopoiesis, together with the associated idea of organisational closure, might evoke the impression that organisms are to be categorised ontologically as substances: ontologically independent, wellindividuated, discrete particulars. However, I argue that this is mistaken. Autopoiesis and biological autonomy, properly understood, require a rigorous commitment to a process ontological view of life.

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Living Systems: Autonomy, Autopoiesis and Enaction

Cited by 39 publications

References 10 publications

Enactive autonomy in computational systems

Enactive autonomy in computational systems

Thinking through enactive agency: sense-making, bio-semiosis and the ontologies of organismic worlds

Autopoiesis, biological autonomy and the process view of life

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