2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.06.006
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Liquidity constraints, informal institutions, and the adoption of weather insurance: A randomized controlled Trial in Ethiopia

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Cited by 56 publications
(50 citation statements)
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“…For example, insured loans coupled with income insurance such that farmers (banks) can use (give) part of the payout for consumption smoothing can protect the most vulnerable farmers from defaulting in case of a drought and may boost credit demand (Farrin and Miranda 2015; Gallenstein et al 2020). Alternatively, a contract that delays premium payments until after harvest can ease liquidity constraints and encourage demand (Belissa et al 2018). Likewise, demand for meso‐insured loans may increase if banks respond to insurance by lowering interest rates, a result predicted by Farrin and Miranda (2015) and Carter, Cheng, and Sarris (2016).…”
Section: Limitationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, insured loans coupled with income insurance such that farmers (banks) can use (give) part of the payout for consumption smoothing can protect the most vulnerable farmers from defaulting in case of a drought and may boost credit demand (Farrin and Miranda 2015; Gallenstein et al 2020). Alternatively, a contract that delays premium payments until after harvest can ease liquidity constraints and encourage demand (Belissa et al 2018). Likewise, demand for meso‐insured loans may increase if banks respond to insurance by lowering interest rates, a result predicted by Farrin and Miranda (2015) and Carter, Cheng, and Sarris (2016).…”
Section: Limitationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Casaburi and Willis (2018), contract farming made it possible for the insurer to finance the premium and then deduct it from payouts to farmers at the end of the season. Belissa et al (2019) find that delayed premium payment without any contract farming agreement increases demand substantially, although default rates are relatively high putting into question the financial viability of this approach. Farmers in our study were involved in contract farming, but we did not offer insurance through their contract farming arrangements, and they were required to pay premiums before planting and not at harvest.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Formal insurance also provides imperfect coverage (or no coverage at all) because it is expensive and because the timing of insurance premiums typically occurs when households are liquidity‐constrained (Belissa, Bulte, Lensink, Gangopadhyay, & Cecchi, 2019). Many index insurance products also suffer from basis risk.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%