2003
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-45215-7_25
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Linear Cryptanalysis on SPECTR-H64 with Higher Order Differential Property

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Cited by 18 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…To thwart DCA-based attack more rounds should be performed. Comparison of earlier results on LCA and DCA of CIKS-1 [19], DDP-64 [20], Spectr-H64 [21], [11] and Cobra-H64 [12] shows that DCA is also more powerful against these DDP-based ciphers than linear one, the DDP boxes are linear primitive though. This is explained by the existence of the single linear characteristic for the DDP-box operations, which includes the sum of all bits of the transformed data block.…”
Section: /64mentioning
confidence: 94%
“…To thwart DCA-based attack more rounds should be performed. Comparison of earlier results on LCA and DCA of CIKS-1 [19], DDP-64 [20], Spectr-H64 [21], [11] and Cobra-H64 [12] shows that DCA is also more powerful against these DDP-based ciphers than linear one, the DDP boxes are linear primitive though. This is explained by the existence of the single linear characteristic for the DDP-box operations, which includes the sum of all bits of the transformed data block.…”
Section: /64mentioning
confidence: 94%
“…Its (0) is specified as follows: (1, 4, 7, 2, 5, 8, 3, 6) (9, 12, 15, 10, 13, 16, The involution I is described with two rotations by 8 bits: 16 . Lastly, as depicted in Fig.3(a), the F -box comprises two three-layer CP boxes P 32/48 and P −1 32/48 separated with fixed permutation which is described as follows: (1, 33) (2, 9)(3, 17)(4, 25)(5)(6, 13)(7, 21)(8, 34, 29, 4 0) (10, 35) (11,18) Table 3. Here, if e = 0 (encryption), …”
Section: Description Of Ddp-64mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With similar methods, we suggest a related key differential attack on full-round CIKS-1. This attack allows us to recover the 32-bit final round key of CIKS-1 with an expected success rate 80% and requires about 2 4 plaintext pairs and 2 33 encryption times. …”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%