Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion

Ichihashi, Shota

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.006

Cited by 17 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(12 reference statements)

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“…In particular, they provide an algorithm that achieves the optimal way to limit the seller's information to maximize the expected buyers' utility. Ichihashi [14] considered a Bayesian persuasion setting and studied how the outcome of the interaction is affected when the sender's information is restricted. One of their results is that, if the receiver restricts sender information in a pre-play stage, the best utility that the receiver can get in this setting coincides with the one that the receiver would get in the "flipped game", where the receiver persuades the sender.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk

2023

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk

2023

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“…Gentzkow and Kamenica ( 2016 ) consider multiple senders and a single receiver and show that the amount of revealed information increases with the number of senders. Ichihashi ( 2019 ) considers a model of a single sender and receiver in which a designer can restrict the most informative message profile that the sender can generate, and he characterizes the information restriction that maximizes the receiver’s payoff. More recently, Brooks et al ( 2022 ) and Mathevet and Taneva ( 2022 ) consider information hierarchies.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Belief inducibility and informativeness

Herings,

Karos,

Kerman

2023

Theory Decis

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We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe private correlated messages that are contingent on the true state of the world. Our focus lies on the beliefs of receivers induced via the signal chosen by the sender and we provide a comprehensive analysis of the inducible distributions of posterior beliefs. Classifying signals as minimal, individually minimal, and language-independent, we show that any inducible distribution can be induced by a language-independent signal. We investigate the role of the different classes of signals for the amount of higher order information that is revealed to receivers. The least informative signals that induce a fixed distribution over posterior belief profiles lie in the relative interior of the set of all language-independent signals inducing that distribution.

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“…, n}, which means n different users in the same area. Each user has to submit his demand information, u i (d i , ω i ), to the governor, which is decided by his true private demand information d i and user i's control effort level ω i related to self-reporting [37]. The cost related to…”

Section: Self-report Information Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

An Optimal Water Resource Allocation Mechanism Based on Ex-Post Verification and Reward in Huangbai River

Zhang

2021

Water

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Under the current administrative system (AS) in China, the water resources governor allocates limited water resources to several users to realize the utility of water resources, leading to a principal–agent problem. The governor (referred to as the principal and she) wishes to maximize water resource allocation efficiency, while each user (referred to as the agent and he) only wishes to maximize his own quota. In addition, the governor cannot know water demand information exactly since it is the water users’ private information. Hence, this paper builds an ex ante improved bankruptcy allocation rule and an ex post verification and reward mechanism to improve water allocation efficiency from the governor’s perspective. In this mechanism, the governor allocates water among users based on an improved bankruptcy rule before the water is used up, verifies users’ information by various approaches, and poses a negative reward to them if their information is found to be false after the water is used up. Then, this mechanism is applied to Huangbai River Basin. Research results show that the improved allocation rule could motivate users to report demand information more honestly, and ex post verification could motivate water users to further report their true information, which, as a result, could improve the water allocation efficiency. Furthermore, this mechanism could be applied to the allocation of other resources.

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Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion

Cited by 17 publications

References 17 publications

Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk

Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk

Belief inducibility and informativeness

An Optimal Water Resource Allocation Mechanism Based on Ex-Post Verification and Reward in Huangbai River

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