Limiting or liberating? The influence of parliaments on military deployments in multinational settings

Abstract

Multilateral contexts often complicate parliaments’ efforts to scrutinise and influence security policy, as parliaments usually work in a national setting. This article explores how the internationalisation of security policy has altered parliamentary constraints on executive decision-making. It focuses on cases where multilateral decision-making is particularly advanced and studies military deployments under the auspices of the European Union’s (EU’s) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Using the examples of France, the United Kingdom and Germany, the article examines how the policy’s location at the intersection of decision-making on security and EU matters creates new opportunities for member state parliaments to scrutinise it. Yet, as an analysis of three CSDP military operations shows, these opportunities do not always translate into increased scrutiny practice and vary in line with factors such as national troop contributions, distinct political traditions and an operation’s salience.

Attendance at the Interparliamentary Conference on the CFSP/CSDP: Fostering the Emergence of a Parliamentary Epistemic Community in the EU?

“…The increasing Europeanisation of policy‐making in the European Union has long favoured an executive dominance over parliaments (Curtin, 2014). This has been and is particularly pronounced in policy domains such as the CFSP and CSDP (Schade, 2018, pp. 85–6), which have remained largely intergovernmental in nature (Wagner, 2013, p. 199).…”

Parliaments in security policy: Involvement, politicisation, and influence

“…Schade stays with European security policy but shows how the multilateralisation of security policy also opens up new opportunities for national parliaments. Where previous research had taken the multilateral character of deployments into account at all, it usually depicted it as a challenge and a problem for national parliaments that were argued to be the losers of the extant two-level games dynamics (e.g.…”

Common Defence of EU Countries : Reality or Fantasy?

“…The first strategic document concerning the Union's foreign and security policy was adopted on 12-13th December 2003� It was A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy ESS (European Council, 2003)� In this relatively short document (consisting of only 14 pages) EU leaders stated the objectives of the organization in terms of foreign and security policy, as well as the means for their realization� The document also indicated key threats to the safety of the continent, i�e�, terrorism, distributing weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, fallen states, and organized crime� Therefore, it would not be surprising to state that the presented catalog, due to the dynamics of events in the EU itself, as well as in its direct neighborhood, soon turned out to be insufficient, and the majority of the adopted methods of operation soon ceased to be adequate to the international situation� Thus, there soon appeared voices of the necessity for its update or even creating a new complex strategy of EU's operation in the international environment� Unfortunately, it was contrary to the document itself, as it was adopted as late as 28th June 2016 (EGS, 2016)� And yet again, this is a "typical" European Union document, very general, not specific, avoiding any categorical and straightforward statements -it even lacks an enumerative catalog of threats, which were mentioned in the ESS� To state it briefly, it defines and indicates the interests of the EU and its citizens; explains rules and values for its external actions; presents priorities of international policy activities; and finally characterizes methods and means for achieving the adopted premises� The most important matter about this document is the fact that the new Strategy made way for actuating the processes creating the Union's defence policy (Samadashvili, 2016, p� 34)� According to Ryszard Zięba, "it rightly connects the internal and external aspects of safety and assumes that internal safety depends on peace outside the Union's borders� Therefore in order to provide the Union's internal safety it anticipates external activities on a broader scale" (Zięba, 2017, p� 50)� The question, whether its records will result in concrete and measurable activities, remains open to a certain extent, as it depends solely on the will of member countries� And past experiences tell us that it is not necessarily bound to happen, as currently in many Union member countries governments are taken over by populists with Eurosceptic attitude� What might be perceived as obvious, in order to be able to fulfill premises adopted in the Strategy (in addition, in the assumed manner) -and at the same time be a credible partner on the international arena -member countries, and therefore the EU itself, need to have sufficient, adequate, flexible, ready, and mobile military capabilities at their disposal� Replenishing the shortages, a reform consisting on moving away from territorial defence forces towards expeditionary forces -all this costs money (and lots of it) and requires time (Zięba, 2017, pp� 39-40) 2 � Moreover, a mental change is required in these terms, with regard to the approach to the role of the Union as the global guardian of order (Domachowska, Gawron-Tabor & Piechowiak-Lamparska, 2018, pp� 201-202;Polcikiewicz, 2018, p� 108;Schade, 2018, p� 84)� Moderate and discreet optimism of the experts in terms of realizing the Strategy, and thus waking up the CSDP, results from the fact that it was followed by important decisions� In June 2017, during an EU summit: a) it was decided that a cell for military planning (Military Planning a...…”