2022
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.002
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Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation

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Cited by 1 publication
(2 citation statements)
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“…Hypothesis Based on Hotelling's model and Armstrong's platform‐pricing model (Armstrong, 2006; Saur et al, 2022; Vainer & Kukacka, 2021), we propose the assumption of a duopoly environment assuming that there are two technology‐trading platforms (platform 1 and platform 2) in the market and that the platform‐pricing model will be characterized in conjunction with the transition stage from an “information‐intermediary platform model” to a “one‐stop‐service platform model”.Hypothesis According to the bilateral market theory (Wang & Fu, 2019; Wang & Guo, 2017; Zhao & Wang, 2020), there are three types of participants in the pricing model of technology‐trading platforms: the platform operator, technology provider, and technology demander, all of which are finite rational “economic men”. The platform operator provides services to providers and demanders to obtain revenue.…”
Section: Hypotheses and The Two‐stage Dynamic Game Model Of Technolog...mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Hypothesis Based on Hotelling's model and Armstrong's platform‐pricing model (Armstrong, 2006; Saur et al, 2022; Vainer & Kukacka, 2021), we propose the assumption of a duopoly environment assuming that there are two technology‐trading platforms (platform 1 and platform 2) in the market and that the platform‐pricing model will be characterized in conjunction with the transition stage from an “information‐intermediary platform model” to a “one‐stop‐service platform model”.Hypothesis According to the bilateral market theory (Wang & Fu, 2019; Wang & Guo, 2017; Zhao & Wang, 2020), there are three types of participants in the pricing model of technology‐trading platforms: the platform operator, technology provider, and technology demander, all of which are finite rational “economic men”. The platform operator provides services to providers and demanders to obtain revenue.…”
Section: Hypotheses and The Two‐stage Dynamic Game Model Of Technolog...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hypothesis 1. Based on Hotelling's model and Armstrong's platform-pricing model (Armstrong, 2006;Saur et al, 2022;Vainer & Kukacka, 2021), we propose the assumption of a duopoly environment assuming that there are two technology-trading platforms (platform 1 and platform 2) in the market and that the platformpricing model will be characterized in conjunction with the transition stage from an "information-intermediary platform model" to a "one-stop-service platform model".…”
Section: Hypotheses and The Two-stage Dynamic Game Model Of Technolog...mentioning
confidence: 99%