Limited not lazy: a quasi-experimental secondary analysis of evidence quality evaluations by those who hold implausible beliefs

Abstract

Past research suggests that an uncritical or ‘lazy’ style of evaluating evidence may play a role in the development and maintenance of implausible beliefs. We examine this possibility by using a quasi-experimental design to compare how low- and high-quality evidence is evaluated by those who do and do not endorse implausible claims. Seven studies conducted during 2019–2020 provided the data for this analysis (N = 746). Each of the seven primary studies presented participants with high- and/or low-quality evidence and measured implausible claim endorsement and evaluations of evidence persuasiveness (via credibility, value, and/or weight). A linear mixed-effect model was used to predict persuasiveness from the interaction between implausible claim endorsement and evidence quality. Our results showed that endorsers were significantly more persuaded by the evidence than non-endorsers, but both groups were significantly more persuaded by high-quality than low-quality evidence. The interaction between endorsement and evidence quality was not significant. These results suggest that the formation and maintenance of implausible beliefs by endorsers may result from less critical evidence evaluations rather than a failure to analyse. This is consistent with a limited rather than a lazy approach and suggests that interventions to develop analytical skill may be useful for minimising the effects of implausible claims.

Human Factors in Forensic Science: Psychological Causes of Bias and Error

“…Future work should continue to examine which cross-examination strategies enable jurors to rightly discount dubious forensic testimony without creating a blanket skepticism that undercuts even valid forensic evidence. Relatedly, recent data from Martire et al (2020) suggest that jurors may be unable-not unwilling-to critically evaluate forensic evidence, such that testimony from an opposing expert and/or judicial instructions may help sensitize them to invalid forensic testimony. Two studies (i.e., Eastwood & Caldwell, 2015;Mitchell & Garrett, 2021) have now found that opposing expert testimony was somewhat effective in this regard, though this question warrants further investigation.…”

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“…There is ample research evidence supporting the idea that people evaluate information on the basis of their existing beliefs and attitudes (see, e.g., Ditto & Lopez, 1992;Edwards & Smith, 1996;Lord et al, 1979;Mojzisch et al, 2014;Taber & Lodge, 2006; but see Martire et al, 2020). The experiment that has a classic status in this domain is the study reported in Lord et al (1979).…”

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“…The degree of update depends on individuals' cognitive ability and the quality and credibility of evidence as better reasoners, compared to less capable reasoners, deviate less from Bayes' rule (Tappin et al, 2020) and individuals update their beliefs more after encountering stronger compared to weaker evidence (Martire et al, 2020).…”

“…In a similar vein, Tappin et al (2020) revealed that although participants' belief updating does not completely mimic a fully Bayesian reasoner, participants, especially those with better reasoning abilities, update their prior beliefs when they were presented with new evidence and hence deviated less from Bayesian norms. The quality of the evidence is of great importance as Martire et al (2020) showed that individuals who believe in implausible claims showed a selective sensitivity to evidence as they were more persuaded by strong than weak evidence.…”