Décembre 1994Ce document est publié dans l'intention de rendre accessible les résultats préliminaires de la recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions.Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l'unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires.This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims to encourage discussion and comment. The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors.
ABSTRACTMany g o v ernments have i n troduced or are considering introducing laws to recover from the liable parties the cleanup costs caused by pollution damages. In particular, the banks who nance the rms causing environmental damages may be considered liable.In various court cases in the US and elsewhere, banks have been found liable, while they have been exempted in others. We develop a multiprincipal-agent model in which the insurance sector may insure the rm for the pollution risk and the bank may lend money for investment. Under complete information of the bank about the rm's activities, the limited liability of the rm induces excessive i n v estment and insu cient care but full liability of the bank creates the appropriate internalization of the environmental risk. This rationalization of the laws on lender liability m ust be quali ed because in general the banks su er from agency problems adverse selection and moral hazard in their relationships with rms. In the adverse selection case, full liability of the bank leads to underinvestment. Partial liability is better but may fail to implement the optimal second best allocation. In the case of moral hazard, full responsibility is killing the project too often while still leading to low care too often. Partial responsibility m a y a c hieve the second best optimal allocation but in some cases the level of responsibility necessary to induce the proper level of care is too high for the project to be nanced by the bank. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results with regards to liability laws for environmental damages.Keywords: Environmental Risk, Pollution, Lender Liability, Banking, CERCLA.
JEL R ESUM EPlusieurs gouvernements ont i n troduit ou pensent i n troduire des lois leur permettant d e recouvrer les coûts de decontamination aupres des parties responsables de la pollution. Les banques des entreprises concernees peuvent, en particulier,être tenues responsables des dommages et elles l'ont e ectivement ete dans certains cas. Nous proposons ici un modele principal-agent a v ec un secteur assurance et un secteur bancaire. Dans le cas ou l a banque possede une information complete des activites de l'entreprise, nous montrons que les regles de responsabilite limitee menent a des niveaux d'investissement e t d e n egligence trop eleves que peut par ailleurs corriger adequatement la pleine responsabilisation de la banque. Cette rationalisation des lois sur la responsabilite des prêteurs doitêtre reexa...