Limitations of End-to-End Encryption in Secure Computer Networks

Padlipsky, M. A.; Snow, D. W.; Karger, Paul A.

doi:10.21236/ada059221

Cited by 72 publications

(52 citation statements)

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“…Cabuk et al [17] suggest the use of -similarity test for detecting [17,90] timing channel, which has a feature of creating clusters of similar IPDs at multiples of some time intervals. This and some other existing detection methods [11,38] targets only specific timing channels, or can not perform well for high variation of network traffic.…”

Section: Defence Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Experiments showed that several timing channels can be detected, like: [90] channel (with abnormal shape and regularity), [17] (with similar shape and abnormal regularity), [40] (with similar shape and regularity as normal traffic) and [104] (with similar shape and regularity as normal traffic).…”

Section: Defence Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Padlipsky et al [90] suggested a covert timing channel, in which the sender send or not send an IP packet in an arranged time interval. If a second is divided in N intervals, the RPR of this channel is N bps.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Covert channels in TCP/IP protocol stack - extended version-

Mileva

Panajotov

2014

Open Computer Science

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We give a survey of different techniques for hiding data in several protocols from the TCP/IP protocol stack.Techniques are organized according to affected layer and protocol. For most of the covert channels its data bandwidth is given. IntroductionAn overt channel is a communication channel within a computer system or network, designed for the authorized transfer of data. A covert channel (first introduced by Lampson [62]), on the other hand, is any communication channel that can be exploited by a process to transfer information in a manner that violates the systems security policy [26]. Any shared resource can potentially be used as a covert channel. Covert channels can be divided primarily in storage and timing channels. In a case of the storage channels, usually one process writes (directly or indirectly) to a shared resource, while another process reads from it. Timing channel is essentially any technique that conveys information by the timing of events, in which case the receiving process needs a clock. Special timing covert channel is counting channel which carries data by counting the occurrences of certain events [44].Additionally, timing channels can be active if they generate additional traffic or passive if they manipulate the timing of existing traffic. As any other communication channel, covert channel can be noisy or noiseless.According to the number of information flows between the sender and the receiver -several or one, there are aggregated and non-aggregated covert channels [36]. According to the presence or absence of the intermediate node in the communication, covert channels can be indirect or direct. Payload tunnel is a covert channel, where one protocol is tunnelled in the payload of the other protocol. Covert channels are studied as a part of the science * E-mail: aleksandra.mileva@ugd.edu.mk † E-mail: boris.panajotov@ugd.edu.mk steganography, and different steganographic methods used in telecommunication networks are known as network steganography.The adversary model is based on the Simmons prisoner problem [105]: two parties want to communicate confidentially and undetected over an insecure channel, the warden. The warden can be passive -which monitor traffic and report when some unauthorized traffic is detected, or active -which can modify the content of the messages with the purpose of eliminating any form of hidden communication. Simmons introduced the term subliminal channel, a variant of covert channel which uses cryptographic algorithm or protocol for hiding messages. A composition of covert channel with subliminal channel is the hybrid channel.Covert channels can be analysed by the total number of steganogram bits transmitted during a second (Raw Bit Rate -RBR), or by the total number of steganogram bits transmitted per PDU (for example, Packet Raw BitRate-PRBR) [78]. In ideal case, if no packets are lost, capacity of some storage channels can be expressed as Steganography in Internet layerInternet Protocol (IP) is the primary protocol in the TCP/IP protocol stack, ...

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Section: Defence Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Defence Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Covert channels in TCP/IP protocol stack - extended version-

Mileva

Panajotov

2014

Open Computer Science

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“…The very first covert timing channels are based on having a sender either send or remain silent in specific time intervals in order to communicate covert message bits 1 and 0, respectively [18,11]. These schemes not only are limited by the need for accurate synchronization between the sender and the receiver, but also are easily detectable using statistical tests [3].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

CoCo: Coding-Based Covert Timing Channels for Network Flows

Houmansadr

Borisov

2011

Information Hiding

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Abstract. In this paper, we propose CoCo, a novel framework for establishing covert timing channels. The CoCo covert channel modulates the covert message in the inter-packet delays of the network flows, while a coding algorithm is used to ensure the robustness of the covert message to different perturbations. The CoCo covert channel is adjustable: by adjusting certain parameters one can trade off different features of the covert channel, i.e., robustness, rate, and undetectability. By simulating the CoCo covert channel using different coding algorithms we show that CoCo improves the covert robustness as compared to the previous research, while being practically undetectable.

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“…The possibility of encoding covert channels in the timing of packets (or frames) was identified early by Padlipsky et al [5]. However, all the timing channels proposed prior to Berk's work [6] were based on encoding in varying packet rates over time as opposed to encoding in IPG values directly.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stealthier Inter-packet Timing Covert Channels

2011

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Abstract. Covert channels aim to hide the existence of communication. Recently proposed packet-timing channels encode covert data in inter-packet times, based on models of inter-packet times of normal traffic. These channels are detectable if normal inter-packet times are not independent identically-distributed, which we demonstrate is the case for several network applications. We show that~80% of channels are detected with a false positive rate of 0.5%. We then propose an improved channel that is much harder to detect. Only~9% of our new channels are detected at a false positive rate of 0.5%. Our new channel uses packet content for synchronisation and works with UDP and TCP traffic. The channel capacity reaches over hundred bits per second depending on overt traffic and network jitter.

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Limitations of End-to-End Encryption in Secure Computer Networks

Cited by 72 publications

References 0 publications

Covert channels in TCP/IP protocol stack - extended version-

Covert channels in TCP/IP protocol stack - extended version-

CoCo: Coding-Based Covert Timing Channels for Network Flows

Stealthier Inter-packet Timing Covert Channels

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