Liminal Movement by Digital Platform-Based Sharing Economy Ventures: The Case of Uber Technologies

Garud, Raghu; Kumaraswamy, Arun; Roberts, Anna; Xu, Le

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3547425

Cited by 11 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…Doing so helps control the quality of participants and enhance the performance of the platform (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). For instance, Uber hires a third-party company to perform background checks on prospective drivers (Garud, Kumaraswamy, Roberts, & Xu, 2020;Karanović, Berends, & Engel, 2021), and individuals who have criminal or particular driving violation histories may be disqualified from driving for Uber. In addition, several studies show that the platform owner can also choose to selectively open its interface by placing restrictions on the use of boundary resources (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013) to protect the platform from certain exploitative activities by rivals.…”

Section: Access Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization

Liang

Tong²,

Tang³

et al. 2021

Journal of Management

111

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The burgeoning digital-platforms literature across multiple business disciplines has primarily characterized the platform as a market or network. Although the organizing role of platform owners is well recognized, the literature lacks a coherent approach to understanding organizational governance in the platform context. Drawing on classic organizational governance theories, this paper views digital platforms as a distinct organizational form where the mechanisms of incentive and control routinely take center stage. We systematically review research on digital platforms, categorize specific governance mechanisms related to incentive and control, and map a multitude of idiosyncratic design features studied in prior research onto these mechanisms. We further develop an integrative framework to synthesize the review and to offer novel insights into the interrelations among three building blocks: value, governance, and design. Using this framework as a guide, we discuss specific directions for future research and offer a number of illustrative questions to help advance our knowledge about digital platforms’ governance mechanisms and design features.

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Section: Access Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization

Liang

Tong²,

Tang³

et al. 2021

Journal of Management

111

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The platform may therefore need the support, or at least tolerance, of market players who do not even understand the new business model, or may not condone it, leading to both "cognitive illegitimacy" and "sociopolitical illegitimacy" (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Garud et al (2022) show how Uber navigated this challenge by deploying a number of market strategies including partnerships, offering economic incentives, and staging high visibility events. In addition, Uber also employed non-market strategies such as circumventing regulation by arguing that it was a technology company rather than a taxi company, fighting state and local labor boards' attempts to categorize drivers as employees, hiring lobbyists to influence regulators, and aligning itself with Mothers Against Drunken Driving.…”

Section: Design and Entry Of New Platforms And Competition With Incum...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Platform ecosystems as meta‐organizations: Implications for platform strategies

Kretschmer

Leiponen

Schilling

et al. 2020

Strategic Management Journal

277

176

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Research summary: Platform ecosystems have spurred new products and services, sparked innovation, and improved economic efficiency in various industries and technology sectors. A distinctive feature of the platform architecture is its modular and interdependent system of core and complementary components bound together by design rules and an overarching value proposition. Accordingly, we conceptualize platforms as metaorganizations, or "organizations of organizations" that are less formal and less hierarchical structures than firms, and yet more closely coupled than traditional markets. To function successfully, however, platforms require coordination among multiple participants not all of whose interests are aligned. These organizational features of platforms raise many interesting and complex strategic challenges and hold implications for how platforms compete. In this paper, we discuss some of the most salient features of platform ecosystems as meta-organizations, specifically in terms of the sources of authority or power in the ecosystem, the motivation and incentives a platform creates to attract participants, and its governance and coordination structures. We then consider how papers appearing in this special issue inform us about the effects of these features on platform competition along three distinct dimensions:

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“…To the extent that a digital platform can interrelate with other technologies, an ecosystem of complementary technologies emerges around it (Cennamo et al, 2018;Jacobides et al, 2018;Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). Innovation within the ecosystem of interrelated technologies extends the functionality of the digital platform (Garud et al, 2020). That is to say, the notion of ecosystem questions where to draw digital platform boundaries.…”

Section: Layered Versus Singular Architecturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additionally, in a multisided market, profits are not only affected by pricesthey are but also primarily affected by how the prices are allocated to different participant groups (Parker and van Alstyne, 2005). This requires, in some ways, a balancing act, but at the same time, the fundamental reason for participating is that it provides economic benefits because of the major efficiencies provided by a platform (Garud et al, 2020). Having stated that, learning to balance the needs of customers, partners and technology providers to ensure that everyone thrives is a complex governance activity (Darking et al, 2008).…”

Section: Multisided Versus One-sidedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking dominant theories used in information systems field in the digital platform era

Hanafizadeh

Khosravi

Tabatabaeian

2020

DPRG

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Purpose Selecting an appropriate theory has always remained a critical task for the digital policy researchers. The literature seems to miss providing theoretical accounts of policy view of the digital platforms governance and offering tools for measuring the effectiveness of policies. To this end, this paper aims to provide a critical review and comparison of dominant information systems (IS) theories used. It highlights the weaknesses of these theories to explain technology features and actor- technology interactions with the rising trend of digital platforms. The main argument of this research is that the policymakers will not have adequate tools for policymaking of digital platforms by following the assumptions of theories used dominantly in the IS field. Design/methodology/approach This paper analyzes the assumptions of dominant IS theories and their applications in the digital policy literature. Then, it shows to what extent these theories are incapable of conceptualizing features of technology and actors’ role in policymaking and governance of digital platforms. Findings This paper identifies three aspects of digital platforms, including layered architecture, multisided (“side” means “participants”) and user interaction based, that dominant IS theories have shortcomings in explaining them. Practical implications The findings of this research can help authorities to take a more realistic view in defining digital platform policy objectives and applying more appropriate tools in policy implementation. Originality/value Discussing insights into the shortcomings of theories helps to define the theoretical requirements for studying policymaking and governance of digital platforms. It also suggests opportunities and recommendations for future studies.

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Liminal Movement by Digital Platform-Based Sharing Economy Ventures: The Case of Uber Technologies

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization

Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization

Platform ecosystems as meta‐organizations: Implications for platform strategies

Rethinking dominant theories used in information systems field in the digital platform era

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