Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Conference on SIGCOMM 2014
DOI: 10.1145/2619239.2626323
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Lightweight source authentication and path validation

Abstract: In-network source authentication and path validation are fundamental primitives to construct higher-level security mechanisms such as DDoS mitigation, path compliance, packet attribution, or protection against flow redirection. Unfortunately, currently proposed solutions either fall short of addressing important security concerns or require a substantial amount of router overhead. In this paper, we propose lightweight, scalable, and secure protocols for shared key setup, source authentication, and path validat… Show more

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Cited by 73 publications
(23 citation statements)
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References 28 publications
(26 reference statements)
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“…Path validation requires that the Internet architecture be incorporated with lightweight enhancements [33], [36], [39]. Specifically, these enhancements allow end-hosts to select forwarding paths and, together with on-path routers, to enforce and verify path compliance.…”
Section: A System Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Path validation requires that the Internet architecture be incorporated with lightweight enhancements [33], [36], [39]. Specifically, these enhancements allow end-hosts to select forwarding paths and, together with on-path routers, to enforce and verify path compliance.…”
Section: A System Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On-path routers are expected to adhere to the packet-carried path indicator for making forwarding decisions. However, malicious or compromised routers may mis-forward packets away from the specified path [9], [10], [33], [36], [39]. Such packet misforwardings tend to degrade performance and breach security [7].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, a compromised SDN data plane can introduce different types of a ack scenarios [6], which are not possible to detect through header flow analysis alone. Some solutions have sought to detect forwarding a acks by monitoring flow statistics from neighboring switches [55], verifying OpenFlow events in the controller [73,78], applying heavy-weight cryptographic approaches [36], and naive controller generated probes [14,16].…”
Section: Scope Of Implementationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…OPT's (Origin and Path Trace) [48] security properties have been formally verified using the Coq interactive theorem prover in [49]. Isabelle is used to give a mechanized proof of the Basic Perturbation Lemma in [50] and to verify the correctness of Warren Abstract Machine (WAM) in [51].…”
Section: Application Of Toolsmentioning
confidence: 99%