2011 IEEE GLOBECOM Workshops (GC Wkshps) 2011
DOI: 10.1109/glocomw.2011.6162375
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Light-weight key distribution and management for Advanced Metering Infrastructure

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Cited by 42 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…For instance, Stuxnet intensively uses RPC for its LAN propagation, as it is used by Siemens products and allowed on firewalls [37]. In addition, although there are various research works on the authentication protocol of smart grid and control systems [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], these protocols can be bypassed as discussed earlier in Section III and IV. Therefore, not only the protocols themselves, but also the contents of such authentication and network protocols should be inspected by DPI-enabled solutions to block such malicious communications.…”
Section: Defensive Measuresmentioning
confidence: 98%
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“…For instance, Stuxnet intensively uses RPC for its LAN propagation, as it is used by Siemens products and allowed on firewalls [37]. In addition, although there are various research works on the authentication protocol of smart grid and control systems [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], these protocols can be bypassed as discussed earlier in Section III and IV. Therefore, not only the protocols themselves, but also the contents of such authentication and network protocols should be inspected by DPI-enabled solutions to block such malicious communications.…”
Section: Defensive Measuresmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Though there are various research works on smart grid security, most of them focus on the risks of individual subsystems or components such as smart meters, control systems and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) [3], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], or on some aspects of smart grid security such as authentication [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32]. Only a few researchers have addressed security aspects of interplays among the smart grid subsystems and components [33], [34], even though the need has been raised [35]; we cannot assess our health even if we are aware of the conditions of all the organs, because they are interconnected.…”
Section: A Smart Gridmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [3], the authors propose a group ID-based mechanism to establish the keys for a large number of entities as we expect in the smart grid environment with many home users. A multiplicative group * q Z (q is a prime number) is used to generate secret keys as follows.…”
Section: Key Management Approaches For Smart Gridmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Does not take into consideration the network topology Group ID [3] Establish the keys for a large number of entities…”
Section: Ref Benefits Inconveniencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It possessed advantages of efficiency and flexibility in key management. Kamto et al [19] presented a light-weight key distribution and management scheme tailored to AMI. Specifically, a group ID-based mechanism was proposed to establish the keys for a large amount of entities with small overhead.…”
Section: E Kms Of Amimentioning
confidence: 99%