Lifeline Aspects of the 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu, Japan, Earthquake

Abstract

After landslides, damage to lifelines was the next most notable feature of the 23 October 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu, Japan, earthquake ( Mw=6.6). Roads and highways sustained damage at over 6,000 locations; rail lines, water systems, and wastewater systems sustained major damage; and over 300,000 customers lost electric power. Nagaoka's water supply was disrupted by the failure of electric power, which illustrates lifeline interaction, and Ojiya's water treatment plant almost lost its intake of raw water. Nagaoka's 1,079- km-long water system sustained damage at 287 locations, and Ojiya's 329- km-long water system sustained damage at 102 locations. In 2,672 km of wastewater piping, damage was sustained at over 9,000 locations, with manhole settlement or uplift at over 1,300 locations. The pattern of refugees was strongly influenced by the availability of lifeline services—primarily, electric power.

Probabilistic seismic damage and loss assessment methodology for wastewater network incorporating modeling uncertainty and damage correlations

“…It is worth noting that both the ALA (2001) and BES (2018a) fragility models do not include damage due to floatation-related issues, which, therefore, were not considered in this study, even though floatation has been a predominant mode of failure in wastewater systems observed after past earthquakes. In addition, besides the service mains, other components like manholes, lift stations, sewage treatment plants, and service laterals are also an integral part of a wastewater system, and their performance is critical to overall system performance, as observed after past seismic events, such as the 1995 Kobe, Japan (Eidinger and Schiff, 1998), 2004 Niigata, Japan (Scawthorn et al, 2006), and 2010–2011 Canterbury, New Zealand earthquake sequence (Eidinger and Tang, 2011; Zorn and Shamseldin, 2017). This study does not consider these assets due to a lack of detailed information on some (e.g.…”

“…Along the 3799-km long wastewater and stormwater pipelines, 1414 repairs were made to pipes damaged due to uplift or settlement of manholes, damage to road surfaces, or inflow and accumulation of soil in the pipes (Eidinger and Schiff, 1998). Following the 2004 Niigata earthquake in Japan, 9000 instances of pipe damage were observed along the 2672-km wastewater network, with over 1300 reported cases of manhole settlement or uplift (Scawthorn et al, 2006). After the 2010-2011 Canterbury, New Zealand earthquake sequence (CES), the Christchurch wastewater network was considered near failure.…”

“…Compared to the large body of literature related to the seismic assessment of other lifeline network systems, only a few of studies have assessed the seismic performance of wastewater systems; e.g., in contrast to potable water distribution systems (Cimellaro et al, 2016; Farahmandfar et al, 2017; Farahmandfar and Piratla, 2018; Fragiadakis and Christodoulou, 2014; Mazumder et al, 2020). Generally, existing studies on wastewater systems can be classified as: (1) reconnaissance studies reporting damage sustained to wastewater systems and the associated factors contributing to the vulnerability of the pipelines (Eidinger and Schiff, 1998; Eidinger and Tang, 2011; Giovinazzi et al, 2015; Scawthorn et al, 2006; Sherson et al, 2015; Zare et al, 2011), (2) empirical studies developing fragility functions for wastewater pipes based on reconnaissance observations (Baris et al, 2021; Liu et al, 2015; Nagata et al, 2011; Shoji et al, 2011), and (3) analytical studies evaluating the seismic performance of wastewater systems (Makhoul et al, 2020; Sigfúsdóttir, 2020; Sousa et al, 2012). Findings have included: (1) the predominant mode of failure is floatation of the pipes or manholes, due to differential settlements caused by liquefaction, (2) pipe failure decreases with increasing diameter and burial depth, and (3) some pipe materials, such as asbestos cement (AC), unreinforced concrete (CONC), cast iron (CI), earthenware (EW), and reinforced concrete with rubber rings (RCRRs), are inherently more vulnerable than other pipe materials, such as polyethylene (PE), polyvinylchloride (PVC), or high-density polyethylene (HDPE) (Giovinazzi et al, 2015).…”

Seismic resilience assessment and improvement framework for electrical substations

“…Electrical substations play a key role in ensuring the continuous power supply from the EPSS as they transform and distribute the electric power. Experience from previous earthquakes [2][3][4][5] indi-cates that substations often suffer significant damage. The reason is a large number of pillar-type electrical equipment with long slender cantilevers that cannot sustain excessive horizontal loads, resulting in not only huge direct losses but also in a massive indirect loss attributed to a long-term electric power supply disruption in residential, commercial, and industrial sectors.…”