Life under Wainwright v. Witt: Juror dispositions and death qualification.

Abstract

The current standard for determining juror qualification in cases in which the prosecution is seeking the death penalty was formulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1985 in Wainwright v. Witt. This standard differs importantly from its predecessor, and requires that prospective jurors be dismissed if their views would prevent or substantially impair their ability to perform their functions as jurors. We assessed respondents according to the criteria imposed by Witt. We also measured independently prospective jurors' abilities to perform the various specific tasks of a capital juror and their disposition to impose the death penally automatically upon defendants convicted of murder punishable by death. Data from 148 respondents, selected randomly from juries on previously tried felony cases, indicated that 28.2% of those includable by the Witt standard would automatically impose the death penalty. Considering all respondents who would be erroneously included or excluded, a total of 36% of the sample showed inconsistencies with the Witt criterion. These findings are discussed in terms of jurors' difficulties in anticipating their roles as capital jurors.

Death Penalty Decisions: Instruction Comprehension, Attitudes, and Decision Mediators

“…Their stimulus materials were replicated and randomly assigned to subsequent participants. This method of screening for death qualification was based on the current standard for death qualification in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) and was adapted from research by Dillehay and Sandys (1996). Although it is likely that more individuals would be excluded from capital juries following an actual voir dire, those eliminated solely because they are not death qualified would be subject to the same standard used in the present study.…”

The Role of Death Qualification in Venirepersons' Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense1

“…In fact, research has suggested that the adoption of the Witt standard has had significant consequences. For example, Dillehay and Sandys (1996) found that 28% of participants who met the Witt standard would, contrary to law, automatically impose the death penalty. In fact, 36% of all venirepersons exhibited attitudes toward the death penalty that were so vehement that it prevented them from being impartial in a capital case.…”

Capital punishment, the moratorium movement, and empirical questions: Looking beyond innocence, race, and bad lawyering in death penalty cases.

“…Death-sentencing procedures in the five "judge-sentencing" states and in the four "advisory" states must, at a minimum, require juries to decide all facts necessary to support a sentence of death to be in conformance with Ring. 20 Researchers estimate that the death and life qualification of capital juries may exclude anywhere between 11% and 40% of otherwise eligible jurors (Acker et al, 1999, p. 55;Dillehay & Sandys, 1996;Haney et al, 1994, p. 627;Thompson, 1989, p. 209). 21 A relatively small number of potential jurors are "nullifiers"; that is, their views about the death penalty are so strong that they cannot render a fair verdict on guilt or innocence.…”

“…Similarly, prospective jurors whose adamant approval of the death penalty would compromise their ability to consider imposing a sentence other than death are not qualified to serve in capital trials (Morgan v. Illinois, 1992). The impact of this latter process, known as "life qualification" or "reverse Witherspooning," on the composition and function of capital juries is not as well understood as the consequences of death-qualifying jurors (Acker, Brody, Harmon, & Richeson, 1999;Dillehay & Sandys, 1996;Haney, Hurtado, & Vega, 1994). The death qualification process threatens both the impartiality and representativeness of guilt-phase juries (Sandys & McClelland, 2003).…”