Life satisfaction, ethical reflection, and the science of happiness

Haybron, Dan

doi:10.1007/s10902-006-9006-5

Cited by 145 publications

(76 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…as a state of mind, happiness is universal. However, Haybron (2007) recently highlighted that ethical norms are crucial in happiness assessment, i.e. its meaning takes cultural-specific forms.…”

Section: The Analytical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Ethics Will Make us Individually and Socially Happier? A Cross-Culture and Cross-Development Analytical Model

Zagonari

2009

J Happiness Stud

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This paper provides an analytical model representing four polar ethical approaches, by linking them to the main ethics suggested by the philosophical, psychological, and socio-economic literature. Moreover, it develops the analytical model in order to obtain rankings of the 4 polar ethical approaches in terms of happiness and, consequently, to provide insights on which ethical approach should be adopted by each individual, according to his characteristics (income level, in DCs or in LDCs, aspiration level): some dynamics are predicted, if the Golden and the Copper rules are applied. Finally, this paper provides insights on which ethical approach should be adopted by each society, according to its characteristics (DCs or LDCs, social distribution of aspiration levels), by predicting happiness levels in alternative countries, according to the prevailing ethics, and by comparing these predictions with the observed happiness levels, in order to provide an empirical test of the analytical model: some dynamics are predicted, with non-Protestant DCs moving to higher, and Protestant DCs towards lower, happiness levels (conditioned to the per capita income), due to the increasing and decreasing rejection of the Golden and Copper rules, respectively, and with LDCs moving to lower (conditioned to the increasing per capita income) in the short-run and higher happiness levels in the long run, by establishing and entertaining conditions that set clear incentives for moral behaviour, in order to increase and decrease the adoption of the Golden and Copper rules, respectively. 2

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Section: The Analytical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Ethics Will Make us Individually and Socially Happier? A Cross-Culture and Cross-Development Analytical Model

Zagonari

2009

J Happiness Stud

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“…MacKerron, 2012). However, some researchers do take life satisfaction to be an altogether different conception of happiness (see Haybron, 2007b for a discussion), and thereby deviate from the Benthamite underpinnings I have thus far described. It is also common to understand life satisfaction as a whole different concept from happiness altogether.…”

Section: Measuring Swbmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sumner, 1996) -a view that is popular among SWB researchers (see Haybron, 2007b). Mill seems to reject the view that attitudes are ultimately the constituents of happiness, as can be read in the distinction between happiness and contentment that he employs.…”

Section: Alternative Views On Happinessmentioning

confidence: 99%

What happiness science can learn from John Stuart Mill

Deijl¹

2016

Intnl. J. Wellbeing

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Many researchers studying subjective wellbeing (SWB) understand SWB as a concept that is close to Bentham's notion of happiness. This conception of happiness is philosophically controversial, because it treats pleasure as a homogenous experience. I analyze an important deviation from Bentham in John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism and its relevance for SWB research: qualitative differences in pleasurable experiences. I argue that in cases where lives involving qualitatively different experiences are compared, Mill's qualitative perspective is incompatible with an important assumption in the SWB literature: that happiness can be meaningfully rated by people on a scale. I illustrate the problem by means of the question of whether becoming a parent makes people happier. I analyze whether the problem can be avoided on alternative views of happiness, but argue that on all plausible accounts of happiness, the problem persists. I conclude that the problem it poses for self-reported happiness is genuine and should be acknowledged by SWB researchers. I end by discussing the ways in which this conclusion can help the study of happiness move forward.

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“…Is she favorably disposed toward it? Life satisfaction need not be a wholly occurrent conscious state to have this kind of significance, and in fact its significance depends on its not being required that the individual have some occurrent thought or feeling about her life at every moment (for further discussion, see Haybron 2007bHaybron , 2008b. Indeed, the only credible alternative to incorporating dispositions is to identify the attitude with something like a representation stored in long-term memory-but this itself is not an occurrent or conscious state, and in fact resembles the ''unconscious mood'' alternative to mood propensities noted below.…”

Section: The Substantive Case For Mood Propensitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mood Propensity as a Constituent of Happiness: A Rejoinder to Hill

Haybron

2008

J Happiness Stud

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In an earlier paper I defended an emotional state theory of happiness. In a basic form, emotional state theories identify happiness with a person's moods and emotions. To this formulation I added a second component, ''mood propensity'': roughly, an individual's disposition to experience moods, which can vary with the circumstances. Scott Hill argues that this view is vulnerable to a serious counterexample and that my intuitive arguments for it are unconvincing. This paper extends my earlier defense of mood propensity as an aspect of happiness, in the process replying to Hill's objections. I argue that the intuitive considerations favoring my view are not weakened by the points Hill raises. Moreover, the inclusion of dispositional elements in a theory of happiness is actually quite common, and there are good substantive, and not just intuitive, reasons for incorporating mood propensity in the account. In particular, it seems to be required by the guiding conception of happiness as a matter of a person's overall emotional condition.

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Life satisfaction, ethical reflection, and the science of happiness

Abstract: ethics, flourishing, happiness, life satisfaction, philosophy, self-reports, subjective well-being, utility, welfare, well-being,

Cited by 145 publications

References 45 publications

Which Ethics Will Make us Individually and Socially Happier? A Cross-Culture and Cross-Development Analytical Model

Which Ethics Will Make us Individually and Socially Happier? A Cross-Culture and Cross-Development Analytical Model

What happiness science can learn from John Stuart Mill

Mood Propensity as a Constituent of Happiness: A Rejoinder to Hill

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