Life-safety risks and optimisation of protective measures against terrorist threats to infrastructure

Stewart, Mark G.

doi:10.1080/15732470902726023

Cited by 39 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…To do so requires the quantification of threat probabilities, risk reductions, losses, and costs of the security measures. This task is challenging, but it is necessary for any risk assessment, and the quantification of security risks and cost‐benefit assessment is increasingly being addressed, as are life‐cycle and cost‐benefit analyses for infrastructure protective measures . Much of this work can be categorized as “probabilistic terrorism risk assessment …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Terrorism Risks and Cost‐Benefit Analysis of Aviation Security

Stewart

Mueller

2012

Risk Analysis

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We evaluate, for the U.S. case, the costs and benefits of three security measures designed to reduce the likelihood of a direct replication of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. To do so, we assess risk reduction, losses, and security costs in the context of the full set of security layers. The three measures evaluated are installed physical secondary barriers (IPSB) to restrict access to the hardened cockpit door during door transitions, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), and the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program. In the process, we examine an alternate policy measure: doubling the budget of the FFDO program to $44 million per year, installing IPSBs in all U.S. aircraft at a cost of $13.5 million per year, and reducing funding for FAMS by 75% to $300 million per year. A break-even cost-benefit analysis then finds the minimum probability of an otherwise successful attack required for the benefit of each security measures to equal its cost. We find that the IPSB is costeffective if the annual attack probability of an otherwise successful attack exceeds 0.5% or one attack every 200 years. The FFDO program is costeffective if the annual attack probability exceeds 2%. On the other hand, more than two otherwise successful attacks per year are required for FAMS to be costeffective. A policy that includes IPSBs, an increased budget for FFDOs, and a reduced budget for FAMS may be a viable policy alternative, potentially saving hundreds of millions of dollars per year with consequences for security that are, at most, negligible.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Terrorism Risks and Cost‐Benefit Analysis of Aviation Security

Stewart

Mueller

2012

Risk Analysis

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“…Similar cost-benefit analyses have shown that the U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service which costs over $1 billion per year fails to be cost-effective, but that hardening cockpit doors is very costeffective (Stewart and Mueller 2008). It therefore appears that many homeland security measures would fail a cost-benefit analysis using standard expected value methods of analysis as recommended by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB); a detailed assessment of threats and vulnerabilities leads to similar conclusions (Mueller 2010, Mueller andStewart 2011). This suggests that policy makers within the U.S. government and DHS are risk-averse.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…This is a challenging task, but necessary for any risk assessment, and the quantification of security risks is recently being addressed (e.g., Stewart et al 2006, Stewart and Netherton 2008, Dillon et al 2009, Cox 2009), as well as recent life-cycle and cost-benefit analyses for infrastructure protective measures (Willis and LaTourette 2008, von Winterfeldt and O'Sullivan 2006, Stewart 2008, 2011. Much of this work can be categorized as 'probabilistic terrorism risk assessment'.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Cost-Benefit Analysis of Advanced Imaging Technology Full Body Scanners for Airline Passenger Security Screening

Stewart¹,

Mueller²

2011

Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management

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The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been deploying Advanced Imaging Technologies (AITs) that are full-body scanners to inspect a passenger's body for concealed weapons, explosives, and other prohibited items. The terrorist threat that AITs are primarily dedicated to is preventing the downing of a commercial airliner by an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) smuggled on board by a passenger. The cost of this technology will reach $1.2 billion per year by 2014. The paper develops a preliminary cost-benefit analysis of AITs for passenger screening at U.S. airports. The analysis considered threat probability, risk reduction, losses, and costs of security measures in the estimation of costs and benefits. Since there is uncertainty and variability of these parameters, three alternate probability (uncertainty) models were used to characterise risk reduction and losses. Economic losses were assumed to vary from $2-$50 billion, and risk reduction from 5-10 percent. Monte-Carlo simulation methods were used to propagate these uncertainties in the calculation of benefits, and the minimum attack probability necessary for full body scanners to be cost-effective were calculated. It was found that, based on mean results, more than one attack every two years would need to originate from U.S. airports for AITs to pass a cost-benefit analysis. However, the attack probability needs to exceed 160-330 percent per year to be 90 percent certain that full body scanners are cost-effective.

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“…The developed modelling methodologies have been complimented by the probabilistic assessment studies which were aimed at infrastructure protection in countering the acts of terrorism and other form of extreme events (eg. Stewart & Netherton, 2008;Stewart et al, 2012;Stewart, 2008;2010a;2010b;2011). This paper is on the topic of modelling impact actions on structures and carries a very different emphasis in comparison with literature (Rusinek et al, 2009;Xi & Zhang, 2012;Al-Thairy & Wang, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simple hand calculation method for estimating deflection generated by the low velocity impact of a solid object

Ali¹,

Sun²,

Lam³

et al. 2014

AJSE

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Codifi ed provisions for estimating impact actions in contemporary codes of practices are convenient to apply but lack generality given that parameters associated with the inertia resistance of the target have not been incorporated into the provisions. This paper introduces algebraic expressions for estimating the maximum defl ection of a structural member when subject to the hard impact action of a fl ying, or fallen, impactor (or projectile). Once the defl ection value is known the equivalent static force value can accordingly be found by calibration. The proposed hand calculation model which is aimed at supporting the design and assessment of structures has been verifi ed by comparative analyses involving physical experimentations and computer simulations. Meanwhile, limitations of the proposed model have also been identifi ed.

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Life-safety risks and optimisation of protective measures against terrorist threats to infrastructure

Cited by 39 publications

References 19 publications

Terrorism Risks and Cost‐Benefit Analysis of Aviation Security

Terrorism Risks and Cost‐Benefit Analysis of Aviation Security

Cost-Benefit Analysis of Advanced Imaging Technology Full Body Scanners for Airline Passenger Security Screening

Simple hand calculation method for estimating deflection generated by the low velocity impact of a solid object

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