“…In Queensland, the election of a centrist Australian Labor Party (ALP) government between 1989 and 1997 drew increased commitments to regulate deforestation on environmental grounds (Evans, 2016). The first major reform occurred in 1997 when the government introduced a Broadscale Treeclearing Policy under the Land Act 1994, requiring landowners to apply for a permit to deforest, assessed against environmental criteria (Dixon, 2000). The regulation of freehold land soon followed with the introduction of the VMA 1999.…”
Section: Regulating Deforestation In Queenslandmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ALP government released a policy during a statewide election held in 1998 to extend controls to freehold land. Following a close election, Labor was able to form a minority government and then moved swiftly to honour the policy by establishing a consultative process through the Vegetation Management Advisory Committee (VMAC) (Dixon, 2000). 2 The ensuing public debate became highly polarising and committee members were unable to reach a consensus on the scope of any reforms (Kehoe, 2009).…”
Section: Regulating Deforestation In Queenslandmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A coalition of the Liberal Party and the Nationals was in power federally, and they remained non-committal on the proposed Queensland laws (Griffin & Greber, 2019). Negotiations between governments over a joint compensation package subsequently collapsed (De Blas, 2000;Dixon, 2000). Combined with intense pressure from agricultural constituencies, the Queensland Premier conceded and watered down the legislation (Kehoe, 2009).…”
Section: Regulating Deforestation In Queenslandmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Critically, the limited scope of the laws and uncertainty about further reform triggered a surge in deforestation activity as landholders moved development plans forward (see Figure 1) (McGrath, 2007;Simmons et al, 2018). Between January 1999 and June 2000, the Queensland bureaucracy approved more than 750 permits to deforest over 1 million hectares (Dixon, 2000).…”
Section: Regulating Deforestation In Queenslandmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Combined with intense pressure from agricultural constituencies, the Queensland Premier conceded and watered down the legislation (Kehoe, 2009). The Vegetation Management Amendment Act 2000 (VMAA 2000) was subsequently passed by Parliament, removing provisions that would protect extensive areas of forests and woodlands, called 'of concern' regional ecosystems (Dixon, 2000;DNRM, 2003). The Premier announced publicly that the laws would not apply to existing permits, nor would there be a moratorium on broadscale deforestation (Beattie, 2003).…”
Section: Regulating Deforestation In Queenslandmentioning
This paper analyses the strategic interests that inform deforestation policies in Australia, and the variance in policy selections over time. A theory of deliberate policy disproportionality is used to analyse 20 years of regulatory reform in Queensland, focusing on the Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 1999. Application of the framework to this case suggests that political executives were prone to deliberately adopt (dis)proportionate policies as a strategic response to either manage or capitalise on stakeholder support or opposition to any proposed legislative change. The high variance in (dis)proportionate deforestation policies is attributed to how political executives respond to claims made by competing constituencies regarding the costs versus benefits of successive reforms. During key reform phases, policy under‐reaction was the norm, and political executives intentionally limited the scope and effectiveness of the VMA 1999 due to perceived impacts on the agricultural sector. Political executives were highly responsive to the emotional investment of rural constituents and averse to introducing policies that required difficult trade‐offs. Elections offered strategic opportunities for delivering more proportionate policies that balanced public environmental benefits with economic impacts, as evidenced by a conditional deforestation ban introduced between 2004 and 2012 and reinstated in 2018.Points for practitioners
Variance in Queensland's deforestation policy over time can be attributed to the intentional decisions by political executives to limit or expand the scope of regulations as a strategic response to stakeholder expectations.
Political executives were responsive to the costs versus environmental impacts/benefits of any deforestation reforms, but prone to policy under‐reaction when the priority was managing the emotive reactions from rural constituencies.
More proportionate regulations, such as the partial deforestation ban of 2004, aimed to balance environmental benefits with compensation for landholders but were only implemented when electorally beneficial.
Stakeholders have a significant influence on disproportionate deforestation policy design and governments will need to manage competing claims to deliver more durable policy outcomes.
“…In Queensland, the election of a centrist Australian Labor Party (ALP) government between 1989 and 1997 drew increased commitments to regulate deforestation on environmental grounds (Evans, 2016). The first major reform occurred in 1997 when the government introduced a Broadscale Treeclearing Policy under the Land Act 1994, requiring landowners to apply for a permit to deforest, assessed against environmental criteria (Dixon, 2000). The regulation of freehold land soon followed with the introduction of the VMA 1999.…”
Section: Regulating Deforestation In Queenslandmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ALP government released a policy during a statewide election held in 1998 to extend controls to freehold land. Following a close election, Labor was able to form a minority government and then moved swiftly to honour the policy by establishing a consultative process through the Vegetation Management Advisory Committee (VMAC) (Dixon, 2000). 2 The ensuing public debate became highly polarising and committee members were unable to reach a consensus on the scope of any reforms (Kehoe, 2009).…”
Section: Regulating Deforestation In Queenslandmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A coalition of the Liberal Party and the Nationals was in power federally, and they remained non-committal on the proposed Queensland laws (Griffin & Greber, 2019). Negotiations between governments over a joint compensation package subsequently collapsed (De Blas, 2000;Dixon, 2000). Combined with intense pressure from agricultural constituencies, the Queensland Premier conceded and watered down the legislation (Kehoe, 2009).…”
Section: Regulating Deforestation In Queenslandmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Critically, the limited scope of the laws and uncertainty about further reform triggered a surge in deforestation activity as landholders moved development plans forward (see Figure 1) (McGrath, 2007;Simmons et al, 2018). Between January 1999 and June 2000, the Queensland bureaucracy approved more than 750 permits to deforest over 1 million hectares (Dixon, 2000).…”
Section: Regulating Deforestation In Queenslandmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Combined with intense pressure from agricultural constituencies, the Queensland Premier conceded and watered down the legislation (Kehoe, 2009). The Vegetation Management Amendment Act 2000 (VMAA 2000) was subsequently passed by Parliament, removing provisions that would protect extensive areas of forests and woodlands, called 'of concern' regional ecosystems (Dixon, 2000;DNRM, 2003). The Premier announced publicly that the laws would not apply to existing permits, nor would there be a moratorium on broadscale deforestation (Beattie, 2003).…”
Section: Regulating Deforestation In Queenslandmentioning
This paper analyses the strategic interests that inform deforestation policies in Australia, and the variance in policy selections over time. A theory of deliberate policy disproportionality is used to analyse 20 years of regulatory reform in Queensland, focusing on the Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 1999. Application of the framework to this case suggests that political executives were prone to deliberately adopt (dis)proportionate policies as a strategic response to either manage or capitalise on stakeholder support or opposition to any proposed legislative change. The high variance in (dis)proportionate deforestation policies is attributed to how political executives respond to claims made by competing constituencies regarding the costs versus benefits of successive reforms. During key reform phases, policy under‐reaction was the norm, and political executives intentionally limited the scope and effectiveness of the VMA 1999 due to perceived impacts on the agricultural sector. Political executives were highly responsive to the emotional investment of rural constituents and averse to introducing policies that required difficult trade‐offs. Elections offered strategic opportunities for delivering more proportionate policies that balanced public environmental benefits with economic impacts, as evidenced by a conditional deforestation ban introduced between 2004 and 2012 and reinstated in 2018.Points for practitioners
Variance in Queensland's deforestation policy over time can be attributed to the intentional decisions by political executives to limit or expand the scope of regulations as a strategic response to stakeholder expectations.
Political executives were responsive to the costs versus environmental impacts/benefits of any deforestation reforms, but prone to policy under‐reaction when the priority was managing the emotive reactions from rural constituencies.
More proportionate regulations, such as the partial deforestation ban of 2004, aimed to balance environmental benefits with compensation for landholders but were only implemented when electorally beneficial.
Stakeholders have a significant influence on disproportionate deforestation policy design and governments will need to manage competing claims to deliver more durable policy outcomes.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.