Abstract. Philip Pettit (2001) has suggested that there are parallels between his republican account of freedom and Amartya Sen's (1970) account of freedom as decisive preference. In this paper, I discuss these parallels from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. I sketch a formalization of republican freedom, and argue that republican freedom is formally very similar to freedom as defined in Sen's "minimal liberalism" condition. In consequence, the republican account of freedom is vulnerable to a version of Sen's liberal paradox, an inconsistency between universal domain, freedom, and the weak Pareto principle. I argue that some standard escape-routes from the liberal paradox -those via domain restriction -are not easily available to the republican. I suggest that republicans need to take seriously the challenge of the impossibility of a Paretian republican.
IntroductionPhilip Pettit (1997) argues that, within the long tradition of republican thought -from the Roman Republic to the United States of America -a particular notion of freedom can be seen as a unifying theme: the notion of freedom as the opposite of subordination or slavery. Such freedom, on Pettit's account, requires more than the absence of "interference", that is, the absence of certain actual constraints on an individual's actions or choices. It requires the absence of "domination", that is, the absence of the possibility of arbitrary interference. Arbitrary interference is the sort of interference that a master can exercise over a slave capriciously, and which the slave is constantly vulnerable to, 1 Acknowledgements. I am grateful to Luc Bovens, Geoffrey Brennan, Keith Dowding, Philip Pettit, and Wlodek Rabinowicz for very helpful comments and discussion. 2 even if the master happens to be going through a spell of goodwill towards the slave. Domination, Pettit reminds us, is a common grievance:"The grievance … is that of having to live at the mercy of another, having to live in a manner that leaves you vulnerable to some ill that the other is in a position arbitrarily to impose … It is the grievance expressed by the wife who finds herself in a position where her husband can beat her at will, and without the possibility of redress; by the employee who dare not raise a complaint against an employer, and who is vulnerable to any of a range of abuses, some petty, some serious, that the employer may choose to perpetrate; by the debtor who has to depend on the grace of the moneylender, or the bank official, for avoiding utter destitution and ruin;and by the welfare dependant who finds that they are vulnerable to the caprice of a counter clerk for whether or not their children will receive meal vouchers." (Pettit 1997, 4-5) On Pettit's republican account, freedom is the absence of domination. As Pettit argues, this can be defined, in more precise terms, as the absence of interference not just in the actual world, but also in all relevant possible worlds. A slave may not suffer interference in the actual world, because his master presently has som...