Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases

Ekstrom, Laura W.

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.003.0013

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Introduction1

Experimental Philosophy Of Free Will1

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2006

2013

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Cited by 19 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…We have reason to doubt both of those premises (Nadelhoffer & Feltz, 2007). 4 For a few examples, see Kane, 1999;Ekstrom, 2002;Pink, 2004. 5 low affect case.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism

Feltz

Cokely

2009

Consciousness and Cognition

155

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“…We have reason to doubt both of those premises (Nadelhoffer & Feltz, 2007). 4 For a few examples, see Kane, 1999;Ekstrom, 2002;Pink, 2004. 5 low affect case.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism

Feltz

Cokely

2009

Consciousness and Cognition

155

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“…Incompatibilists think the answer is "no." Deeply held and pervasive intuitions are widely regarded as being important to answering the compatibility question by traditional and experimental philosophers of free will (Ekstrom, 2002;Kane, 1996;Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2004, 2005Nichols & Knobe, 2007;Pink, 2004;Sommers, 2009. For example, judgments about free will and moral responsibility are often claimed to be widespread and part of the fabric of human existence.…”

Section: Experimental Philosophy Of Free Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

An error theory for compatibilist intuitions

Feltz¹,

Millan

2013

Philosophical Psychology

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One debate in the experimental exploration of everyday judgments about free will is whether most people are compatibilists or incompatibilists. Some recent research suggests that many people who have incompatibilist intuitions are making a mistake; as such, they do not have genuine incompatibilist intuitions. Another worry is whether most people appropriately understand determinism or confuse it with similar, but different, notions such as fatalism. In five studies we demonstrate people distinguish determinism from fatalism. While people overall make this distinction, a large percentage of people still judge that a person who is fated to perform an action is both free and morally responsible for that action. Those who thought that one freely performs and is morally responsible for a fated action had much stronger compatibilist judgments. These data suggest that a substantial percentage of people have "free will no matter what" intuitions. As a result, even though many people may appear to be compatibilists, they are not.

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“…10 10 See Smilansky (2003: 259), Pereboom (2001: xvi), O'Connor (2000: 4), Nagel (1986: 113, 125), Campbell (1951: 451), Ekstrom (2002: 310), and Pink (2004: 12). Nahmias et al (2006) share our assessment of the literature. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%