Liberalization Challenges in Hungary

Korkut, Umut

doi:10.1057/9781137075673

Cited by 38 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…redesigning the power of the Constitutional Court), and/or circumvent institutional constraints by politically loyal appointees. -The executive branch of government dominates the legislative branch to a large extent (Korkut 2012). This is hardly a new trend in Hungary, however, Fidesz has further disciplined its MPs through formal and informal norms.…”

Section: Discussion: Policy Capacities Political Leadership and Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Driven by politics: agenda setting and policy-making in Hungary 2010–2014

Boda

Patkós

2018

Policy Studies

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A general assumption about the policy making process in Hungary is that in the past four years it has been largely dominated by political initiatives originating from the government and the ruling party. That is, policy change has been primarily driven by political initiatives of the power centre, instead of being responsive to the concerns of the public. In our study, we are empirically testing the hypothesis about the politically driven policy change, using the media agenda and legislative agendas of the Hungarian Comparative Agendas Project. We identified the important policy changes as those topics to which the media has provided a larger-than-average coverage on a yearly basis. Outstanding coverage has been usually linked to one policy issue, and in most of the cases, we found some kind of policy decision related to the issue. However, locating the policy decision or the first interpellation related to the given issue we found that they usually preceded the media coverage-that is, instead of the media agenda pulling the policy agenda, the general logic is just the opposite: media is talking about the policy initiatives of the government. Only a few cases show the 'textbook case' of increased media coverage spurring political interest.

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Section: Discussion: Policy Capacities Political Leadership and Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Driven by politics: agenda setting and policy-making in Hungary 2010–2014

Boda

Patkós

2018

Policy Studies

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“…They have conceived of competitive elections as the mechanism of the translation of the popular will. De la Torre (2015: 13) argues this point for two contemporary cases of populist rule: “President Rafael Correa of Ecuador views elections as the ultimate expression of the people’s will, as did the late Hugo Chavez of Venezuela.” In a different context, Hungarian right-wing populist Prime-minister Orban, celebrates the “revolution of the ballot boxes” that replaced “elite pacts” (in Korkut, 2012: 166). Similarly, Argentina’s Peron (1950: 180) describes democracy in one of his speeches as “the expression of the people’s will in free elections,” and also he states that “… so long as the responsibility is mine, there will be no more [electoral] fraudulency practiced … Because this is true democracy; that which is based on the will of the people” (Peron, 1950: 63).…”

Section: Direct Representation Of the Popular Will And Modern Democracy As A Mixed Regimementioning

confidence: 99%

Populist Peril to Democracy: The Sacralization and Singularization of Competitive Elections

Sözen

2019

Political Studies Review

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In this article, I critically engage with the populism literature, and predicated on a conceptualization of modern democracy as a mixed regime (combining oligarchy and democracy), I provide a mechanism to connect populism-in-power to authoritarianism. As such, I elucidate a particular populist path to authoritarianism in a competitive setting by exploring two questions. First, what is the impact of populism-in-power on the modern democratic mixed regime? Second, what is the locus of populism in a modern democratic institutional framework? Utilizing the Turkish and Argentinean cases as illustrative examples of populism-in-power, I conclude that, first, unless a populist vision is accompanied by democratic institutions outside of the spectrum that modern democracy offers, when that vision which sacralizes and singularizes competitive elections becomes preponderant, it will lead to the opposite of its claim of making the people sovereign, and instead will make the rulers sovereign. Second, I argue that although there is no internal contradiction between modern democracy’s liberal or constitutional and democratic elements, there is still a paradox surrounding modern democracy. This paradox is found between the sources of its imaginative appeal and its practice as a mixed regime, and this is where we should place the perennial potential of populism.

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“…This meant that liberalisation in Hungary would become imbued with romantic, pro-capitalist, ideals. 36 In Ireland, by contrast, the liberals tended not to be romantics, and the romantics tended to be anti-capitalist. But in Hungary, '[c]ivic virtue was associated both with social and economic equality, which nurtured solidarity among citizens, and with economic independence, which ensured that citizens need not rely on the charity of the others.'…”

Section: What Arthur Griffith Saw In Hungary: the Liberal And Natmentioning

confidence: 99%