Liberalism with Honor

Krause, Sharon R.

doi:10.2307/j.ctv10crdfh

Cited by 114 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…38 Appiah (2010). See also Stewart (1994); Krause (2002); Welsh (2008); Appiah (2010); Sessions (2010); Oprisko (2012); Cunningham (2013); Rabbås (2015). 39 But see also e.g.…”

Section: Hybristic Conduct and Disposition In The Graphê Hubreôsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Public Charge for Hubris Against Slaves: The Honour of the Victim and the Honour of the Hubristēs

Canevaro

2018

J. Hell. Stud.

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This article discusses the rationale and the implications of the inclusion of slaves as victims of punishable hubris in the law about the graphē hubreōs. It argues that hubris against slaves was a punishable offence in Athens not because slaves had institutionally and legally recognized rights or a modicum of honour, but rather because it was hubris, as a disposition to overstep and overestimate one's claims to honour (although manifested in concrete acts), that was deemed unacceptable. The article also investigates the implications of the law for our understanding of the connectedness of ‘legal’ and allegedly ‘extra-legal’ spaces, as well as advocating an understanding of honour that is not necessarily competitive and zero-sum, but also cooperative and aimed at securing smooth social interaction in all spheres of social life.

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“…38 Appiah (2010). See also Stewart (1994); Krause (2002); Welsh (2008); Appiah (2010); Sessions (2010); Oprisko (2012); Cunningham (2013); Rabbås (2015). 39 But see also e.g.…”

Section: Hybristic Conduct and Disposition In The Graphê Hubreôsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Public Charge for Hubris Against Slaves: The Honour of the Victim and the Honour of the Hubristēs

Canevaro

2018

J. Hell. Stud.

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“…Liberal political theorists see honor primarily as a domestic virtue-the inclination toward justice and upholding and protecting civil rights or moral principlesin a manner that defies self-interest in favor of the common good (Pangle 1973:67;Krause 2002). When it comes to international politics, liberals view states' behavior as a function of domestic preferences, hence in principle leaving sufficient leeway for the introduction of honor as a distinct determinant of foreign policy decision making.…”

Section: Honor and Foreign Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Honor as Foreign Policy: The Case of Israel, Turkey, and theMavi Marmara

Saltzman

2015

Int Stud Rev

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While the role of honor as a war‐generating factor has been widely discussed in International Relations (IR) scholarship, there is insufficient theoretical and empirical research that identifies and conceptualizes the influence of honor on foreign policy decision making. It is the argument of this article that honor plays a dramatic role not only in causing conflicts but also in negotiations to resolve them. To illustrate this point, the article examines the way Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman's conception of honor shaped Israel's foreign policy toward Turkey following the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis of May 2010. Mine honor is my life; both grow in one; Take honor from me, and my life is done.˜William Shakespeare, Richard II

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“…The latter idea has been explored lately in legal and political philosophy. See Krause (2002), Kaufman (2013). That the concepts of dignity and honour should be kept apart is urged in Berger (1970).…”

Section: Shame As Injury To Honourmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Hobbesian Theory of Shame

Berkovski¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

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On most accounts present in the literature, the complex experience of shame has the injury to self-esteem as its main component. A major objection to this idea is that it fails to differentiate between shame and disappointment in oneself. I argue that previous attempts to respond to the objection are unsatisfactory. I argue further that the distinction should refer to the different ways the subject's self-esteem is formed. A necessary requirement for shame is that the standards and values by which the subject judges himself are borrowed from a canon of values the subject accepts as a given. The proper focus of shame is the fact of conformity to that canon. Those agents who have a different conception of self-esteem and who freely set and alter their own values are prone to self-disappointment, but not to shame.

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Liberalism with Honor

Cited by 114 publications

References 0 publications

The Public Charge for Hubris Against Slaves: The Honour of the Victim and the Honour of the Hubristēs

The Public Charge for Hubris Against Slaves: The Honour of the Victim and the Honour of the Hubristēs

Honor as Foreign Policy: The Case of Israel, Turkey, and theMavi Marmara

A Hobbesian Theory of Shame

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