This essay surveys three prominent trends in current pragmatist political philosophy: Deweyan Democratic Perfectionism, Rortyan Ironism, and Pragmatist Epistemic Deliberativism. After articulating the main commitments of each view, the author raises philosophical problems each must confront. The essay closes with the more general criticism that pragmatist political theory has been nearly exclusively focused on democracy, but needs to address additional topics.As recent accounts emphasize (Bacon, Burke, 2013, Misak 2013, pragmatism is the name of an unruly philosophical family. The earliest pragmatists -Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey -disagreed over fundamentals, and when post-Deweyan pragmatists like are included, the discord becomes only more pronounced. Perhaps the most that can be said is that pragmatism is a series of ongoing disputes about truth, meaning, and value that was inaugurated by American empirical naturalists committed to the idea that empiricism must begin from a socialized account of human activity.One might expect a philosophy with that orientation to focus on issues in political philosophy. Surprisingly, such matters were of little concern to Peirce and James, and much of subsequent pragmatism has followed them in attending mostly to issues in metaphysics, epistemology, meta-ethics, and the philosophy of language. It was Dewey who placed political philosophy at the top of pragmatism's agenda. Accordingly, a longstanding trend takes politics -particularly, democracy -to form the core of pragmatist philosophy. Currently, there are three prominent streams within pragmatist political philosophy: Deweyan democratic perfectionism, Rortyan ironism, and pragmatist epistemic deliberativism. For each, I will provide a brief description and then sketch a few lingering problems.