Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy

Abstract

The central argument of this book is that liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy, as well as, specifically, liberal constitutional democracy all work, when they do, because they serve the mutual advantage of the politically effective groups in the society through coordination of those groups on a political and, perhaps, economic order. These arguments are applied both to the early history of constitutional developments in the United States and to contemporary transitions from autocratic regimes to market democracies. A subsidiary claim is that constitutional political institutions and democratic procedures generally require not so much active support as merely acquiescence in order to survive and work. These are explanatory theses, not normative claims, but they have relevance for normative claims if one takes seriously some relative of Kant's dictum that ought implies can. If we are to insist that some form of government is normatively right for a particular society, we must be able to say that it would or could work for that society. It is commonly argued that what makes democracy right is that it works by consent. If so, it is such a distressingly minimal form of consent—acquiescence—as to be normatively disqualified. If we rule out mere acquiescence as adequate for consent, it seems likely that no credible argument can be adduced to defend liberal constitutional democracy in any detail on grounds of consent or contractarianism. Hence, concern for workability, which should be central to any moral assessment of principles of social order, undercuts the entire consent school of political theory.

An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule

“…This is because the strong attractiveness property of majority rule makes up for its weaker retentiveness property. Institutional framers who want to obtain Pareto-optimal outcomes will want to consider these differences before they impose unanimity rule as a method of finding optimal quantities of public goods (Cornes and Sanlder 1996;Lindahl [1919] 1967), the best allocation of resources in a legislature (Aldrich 1995;Niou and Ordeshook 1985), or efficient voting rules for an assembly (Hardin 1999;Buchanan and Tullock 1962).…”

Behavioral Economics, Federalism, and the Triumph of Stakeholder Theory

“…In the United States, federalism stands among the most efficacious means for restraining governmental abuse (Hardin, 2003). The states' rivalries and their common competition against the federal government lessen the chance for government mischief whether by the states or the national government.…”

Postwar Reconstruction: Some Insights from Public Choice and Institutional Economics

“…The key question is one of workability. A workable political order is one that provides mutually advantageous benefits to enough people such that it is enduring (Hardin 1999). The issue of the workability of the political order comes into play on two fronts.…”