Liberal modernity and the classical realist critique of the (present) international order

Abstract

In their critique of liberal modernity, classical realists theorized its consequence for the heightened sense of insecurity and powerlessness of the individual on the one hand, and the individual's identification with extreme nationalism and violence on the other. This became the challenge posed by liberal modernity in the post-1945 international order. The article argues that the present international order is an extension of the post-1945 order that never resolved this challenge. While the ‘embedded’ form of liberalism that lasted until the early 1970s made social compromises that mitigated the socio-economic insecurities of the individual in liberal modernity, it did not resolve this challenge. The later advancement of neo-liberalism only further intensified it. The article thus critiques existing debates that downplay the challenge of liberal modernity in their analyses of the crisis of the present international order. It concludes that if the present international order is to be put on more stable and peaceful grounds, it requires a more radical break from its post-1945 and post-Bretton Woods past: a break that does not simply call for ‘leadership’ or ‘offshore balancing’ but addresses the psycho-social needs of the individual in liberal modernity.

From the Twenty Years’ Crisis to the climate crisis: Reconsidering Carr’s thoughts on nationalism and global reform

“…Over a decade ago, Richard Beardsworth wrote that the 'stark incompatibility between a cosmopolitan and realist perspective is, at least, theoretically misplaced' (Beardsworth, 2008: 95; see also Craig, 2003). Since then, and in contrast to Mearsheimer's (2005) static interpretation of Carr, a growing body of scholarship on the realist case for global reform emerged (Craig, 2016;Karkour, 2022b;Scheuerman, 2011). Situated in this literature, this article applied a novel reading of Carr's analysis of nationalism and global reform to shed light on the climate crisis.…”

A Twenty Years’ Crisis? Rethinking the Cases for U.S. Economic Engagement with China

“…Resonating with these developments, structural realists spearhead accusations that the U.S. decision to economically engage China was a strategic folly. On the one hand, they claim that the engagement decision was driven by liberal idealism, which reflected American convictions rather than capabilities and interests (Glaser 2019;Karkour 2022a;Mearsheimer 2005Mearsheimer , 2018Porter 2020;Walt 2018). On the other hand, leading structural realists lament that the United States should have employed a realist worldview and eschewed building cordial economic ties with China to slow down that country's growth as much as possible (Mearsheimer 2001(Mearsheimer , 2021.…”