Lexical Alternatives as a Source of Pragmatic Presuppositions

Abusch, Dorit

doi:10.3765/salt.v0i0.2867

Cited by 45 publications

(81 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The present section reviews the projection problem using i. Aspectual predicates like "continue" and "stop" (Simons, 2001;Abusch, 2002;Abrusán, 2011) ii. Attitude predicates like "know ", "realize", and "regret" (Kiparsky & Kiparsky, 1970;Karttunen, 1973Karttunen, , 1974Heim, 1992;Abusch & Rooth, 2004;Beaver, 2001Beaver, , 2010 iii.…”

Section: Presupposition Projectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presupposition and Implicature

Potts¹

2015

The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory

205

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Section: Presupposition Projectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presupposition and Implicature

Potts¹

2015

The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory

205

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“…However, there is in general no systematic attempt to lay the foundations of a classification. Three notable exceptions are Abbott (2006), Abusch (2002Abusch ( , 2010 and Zeevat (1992). Zeevat's proposal is discussed in section 3.3.…”

Section: Introspective Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3. Abusch's (2002; suspension test, as in (11) (9) [Context: Paul has never seen or heard about Mary smoking, but she seems very nervous and restless. He wonders whether Mary has been smoking and is trying to stop] Is Mary quitting smoking?…”

Section: Basic Notionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Orthogonality and Presuppositions: A Bayesian Perspective

Jayez¹

2015

Bayesian Natural Language Semantics and Pragmatics

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Abstract. This work focuses on the reasons why the projection properties of presuppositional elements are not uniform. Presupposition projection designates the fact that operators that suspend the truth of a proposition have no effect on the presupposition it is associated with. For instance, with Paul did not stop smoking, the main content (that Paul does not smoke) is canceled by the negation whereas the presupposition that Paul has been smoking is left untouched. It has been observed that projection is not uniform across the different expressions that convey a presupposition (its triggers), and a distinction between weak and strong triggers has emerged. It seems that this distinction correlates with an intuition of (non-)orthogonality, that is, of (non-)independence between the main content and the presupposition. I argue that this intuition is correct to some extent but has to be clarified. To this aim, I propose a Bayesian approach, which provides a more precise rendering of orthogonality.

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“…A much discussed topic in the presupposition literature is the fact that the presuppositions of some triggers appear to be more context dependent and more easily defeasible than others (Karttunen 1971, Stalnaker 1974, Chierchia & McConnellGinet 2000, Simons 2001, Abusch 2002, Abbott 2006and Klinedinst 2010. Abusch (2002) introduces the terminology "soft" and "hard triggers" to distinguish these two classes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Abusch (2002) introduces the terminology "soft" and "hard triggers" to distinguish these two classes. A paradigmatic example of a soft trigger is win, whereas an example of a hard one is it-clefts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Presuppositions of Soft Triggers aren't Presuppositions

Romoli¹

2015

SALT

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Presupposition triggers can be divided in two groups on the basis of whether the presuppositions they give rise to are easily defeasible or not. Abusch (2002) calls these two groups "soft" and "hard" triggers. In this paper I argue that the "presuppositions of soft triggers" is a label that actually identifies meaning components that sometimes arise as plain entailments and sometimes as scalar implicatures. I propose a way to derive them based only on alternatives and an independently justified theory of scalar implicatures. This will be able to explain how and when these inferences can be suspended, while also accounting for the "regular" projection behavior when they are not suspended. Furthermore, the proposed system will also account for puzzling cases arising from the interaction between the presupposition of soft triggers and scalar implicatures.

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Lexical Alternatives as a Source of Pragmatic Presuppositions

Abstract: No abstract.

Cited by 45 publications

References 6 publications

Presupposition and Implicature

Presupposition and Implicature

Orthogonality and Presuppositions: A Bayesian Perspective

The Presuppositions of Soft Triggers aren't Presuppositions

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