Lewis, Peirce, and the Complexity of Classical Pragmatism

Robin, Richard S.

doi:10.1353/csp.2006.0014

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…1 "[Note on Kant's Refutation of Idealism]" (W8:80). I will use the following abbreviations to cite Peirce's writings: CP for Peirce 1931-52, followed by volume and paragraph number; EP for Peirce 1992-1998, followed by volume and page number; RLT for Peirce 1992; W for Peirce 1982-, followed by volume and page number; R for Peirce's unpublished manuscripts in Houghton Library at Harvard University, followed by manuscript number (according to Robin, 1967).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peirce on Kant’s Refutation of Idealism

Gava

2024

The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce

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This chapter analyzes two short texts in which Peirce sketches out an anti-skeptical argument inspired by Kant’s refutation of idealism. The chapter will first consider why Peirce found Kant’s argument interesting and promising, given that it is often regarded as problematic and unsuccessful. It will then briefly reconstruct Kant’s refutation, highlighting its most problematic passages. Moreover, since Peirce’s own version of the argument relies on Kant’s views regarding the temporal structure of consciousness, the chapter will explain how Peirce tackles this issue in “The Law of Mind.” Finally, the chapter considers Peirce’s own anti-skeptical argument and examines whether and how it can be seen as appropriating Kant’s strategy.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peirce on Kant’s Refutation of Idealism

Gava

2024

The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce

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“…Both Peirce's leaning on Kant, much denied by the semiotics scholars around the work of John Deely, and the distinction between the ineffability of the primitive side of quale-consciousness and "vividness" find support in Husserl's sharp distinction between the "sensuous" which "has in itself nothing pertaining to intentionality" and intentionality proper [45] (p. 203). Another intriguing point is made by Peirce in the Lowell Lectures of 1903 when he observes that a "symbol" can "stand in for a Quale or, what is again the same, to have meaning without truth" [75].…”

Section: Iconicitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He reformulates the traditional distinction of vehicle and tenor as "two relata" and their "different quality sets of each", before identifying Peircean metaphor as "a symbol whose iconicity dominates". This allows for "indexical and symbolic" aspects in one and the same metaphor, according to Peirce's rule that "one sign frequently involves all three modes of representation" [75]. Crucial here is that metaphoric iconicity lies "in the unity of the two" components as "a third thing which they somehow constitute".…”

Section: Metaphoric Hypoiconicitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Hypoiconicity as Intentionality

Ruthrof

2022

Philosophies

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The paper analyses Peirce’s hypoiconicity through the lens of Husserlian intentionality. Peirce’s triple structure of hypoiconicity as resemblance relation, diagrammatical reasoning and metaphoric displacement is shown to require intentional acts in its production and interpretation. Regarding hypoiconicity as a semiotic schematization of Vorstellung, the paper places it in the context of Husserl’s conception of intentionality in which iconicity appears as a stepping-stone towards the skeletonization of resemblance in diagrammatical abstraction and as schematic displacement in metaphor. As such, hypoiconic intentionality is argued to play a role also in Peirce’s community conception of language. The paper’s core claim is that intentionality provides an avenue for revealing hypoiconicity as a major, critical concept of semiotics, functioning as paradigm case for investigating the convergence of semiotics and phenomenology.

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“…He is also a wonderful and kind person who has never confused requiring the highest standards for philosophical discussion with competing on whom has the strongest argument. 2 I will use the following abbreviations to cite Peirce's writings: RLT for Peirce 1992; W for Peirce 1982-, followed by volume and page number; EP for Peirce 1992Peirce -1998, followed by volume and page number; R for Peirce's unpublished manuscripts in Houghton Library at Harvard University, followed by manuscript number (according to Robin, 1967).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peirce on Vital Matters and the Scientific Method

Gava¹

2023

Pragmatic Reason

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In this paper, I try to make sense of some puzzling claims that Peirce makes in the Cambridge conferences lectures. I identify four tasks that a successful interpretation of those claims must accomplish. First, we must provide a plausible reading of the "no belief in science" thesis. Second, we must provide a compelling interpretation of the "no science in vital matters" thesis. Third, we must explain Peirce's distinction between two forms of holding for true. Fourth, we should be able to solve the conflict with "The fixation of belief." I start by analysing Christopher Hookway's reading of Peirce's claims because he clearly identifies these tasks and offers an interpretation with considerable merits. However, I identify a problem in Hookway's reading, since he fails to account for a normative dimension of the "no science in vital matters" thesis. Finally, I sketch my attempt to accomplish these four tasks while also avoiding this latter problem.

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Lewis, Peirce, and the Complexity of Classical Pragmatism

Cited by 3 publications

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Peirce on Kant’s Refutation of Idealism

Peirce on Kant’s Refutation of Idealism

Hypoiconicity as Intentionality

Peirce on Vital Matters and the Scientific Method

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