Proceedings 2014 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium 2014
DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2014.23238
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Leveraging USB to Establish Host Identity Using Commodity Devices

Abstract: Abstract-Determining a computer's identity is a challenge of critical importance to users wishing to ensure that they are interacting with the correct system; it is also extremely valuable to forensics investigators. However, even hosts that contain trusted computing hardware to establish identity can be defeated by relay and impersonation attacks. In this paper, we consider how to leverage the virtually ubiquitous USB interface to uniquely identify computers based on the characteristics of their hardware, fir… Show more

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Cited by 25 publications
(29 citation statements)
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“…The adversary develops and distributes a malicious application usually as a Trojan (step 1). They trick the victim into installing the application (step 2) through techniques such as social engineering (e.g., a malicious application disguised as a game or a note taking application or through USB connection to bogus devices [2]). Previous works have found examples of such applications with backdoors in the Android marketplace [30], [32].…”
Section: Attack Vectormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The adversary develops and distributes a malicious application usually as a Trojan (step 1). They trick the victim into installing the application (step 2) through techniques such as social engineering (e.g., a malicious application disguised as a game or a note taking application or through USB connection to bogus devices [2]). Previous works have found examples of such applications with backdoors in the Android marketplace [30], [32].…”
Section: Attack Vectormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, the method using distributions of IATs requires a large number (at least 2500) of training samples to achieve accurate results, but with some devices on ICS networks being polled at an interval as large as a few seconds, this would result in unacceptably slow operation. Another technique was developed that used timing measurements of USB enumerations to fingerprint host devices [4], but this is also impractical in the ICS environment where most devices do not have USB interfaces and where it is desirable to passively fingerprint all devices on the network at once rather than driving out to remote locations to fingerprint each individual device.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Often firmware fingerprinting is not sufficient and thus it required to fingerprint the device itself. Many approaches exist for fingerprinting and identification of computing device and sensors [6,14,19]. However, the fingerprinting features used by these techniques are strongly linked to the real hardware or the way the live devices operate.…”
Section: Device Fingerprinting and Identificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Within this context we formulate the following problems: (i) how to automatically label the brand and the model of the device for which the firmware is intended and (ii) how to automatically identify the vendor, the model, and the firmware version of an arbitrary web-enabled online device. File classification and (web) fingerprinting might seem trivial problems, however, such problems are not trivial and were addressed in different contexts, for file classification [5,26,27,32], device fingerprinting [6,14,19], and web fingerprinting [1,2,29,33]. Moreover, these problems need to be addressed in a reliable and scalable manner which is independent of device, vendor, or custom protocols running on the device.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%