Lessons for fisheries management from the EU cod recovery plan

Abstract

The performance of the EU long-term management plan for cod stocks, in force since 2009, is analysed focusing on the human and institutional factors. The plan operates through landings quotas (TACs) and effort restrictions following a Harvest Control Rule, and deploys a novel instrument allowing Member States to 'buy back' or increase fishing effort for fleet segments engaged in cod-avoidance measures. The stipulated fishing mortality reductions have not been achieved. On the positive side, the 'buy-back' instrument has led to increased uptake of selective gear and implementation of permanent and real-time temporary closures. On the negative side, ignoring the dimension of fishers as reactive agents in the design, the impact assessment, and the annual implementation of the measures has contributed to the failure to adequately implement the plan and achieve its objectives. The main problem is that the landings quotas taken in a mixed fishery did not limit catches because fishers were incentivised to continue fishing and discard overquota catch while quota for other species was available. The effort limitations intended to reduce this effect were insufficient to adequately limit fishing mortality in targeted fisheries, although fishers experienced them as prohibiting the full uptake of other quotas. Recommendations for future plans include (i) management through catch rather than landings quotas, (ii) the internalisation of the costs of exceeding quotas, (iii) use of more selective gear types, (iv) the development of appropriate metrics as a basis for regulatory measures and for evaluations, (v) participatory governance, (vi) fisherybased management, (vii) flexibility in fishing strategy at vessel level. Keywords AbstractThe performance of the EU long-term management plan for cod stocks, in force since 2009, is analysed focusing on the human and institutional factors. The plan operates through landings quotas (TACs) and effort restrictions following a Harvest Control Rule, and deploys a novel instrument allowing Member States to 'buy back' or increase fishing effort for fleet segments engaged in cod-avoidance measures. The stipulated fishing mortality reductions have not been achieved. On the positive side, the 'buy-back' instrument has led to increased uptake of selective gear and implementation of permanent and real-time temporary closures. On the negative side, ignoring the dimension of fishers as reactive agents in the design, the impact assessment, and the annual implementation of the measures has contributed to the failure to adequately implement the plan and achieve its objectives. The main problem is that the landings quotas taken in a mixed fishery did not limit catches because fishers were incentivised to continue fishing and discard overquota catch while quota for other species was available. The effort limitations intended to reduce this effect were insufficient to adequately limit fishing mortality in targeted fisheries, although fishers experienced them as prohibiting the full uptake of othe...

Synergies between climate and management for Atlantic cod fisheries at high latitudes

“…The implementation of the new management regime for BS cod was facilitated by the more than 50-y cooperation in science and management between the two key players, Russia and Norway (50). The fact that only two countries/entities were involved simplified the implementation scheme in comparison with, for example, European Union waters (51). Furthermore, the HCR was introduced during a period of moderate stock abundance (Fig.…”

Knowledge production at boundaries : an inquiry into collaborations to make management plans for European fisheries

“…A move towards more participatory research and governance practices in EU fisheries is envisaged to result in greater stakeholder buy-in and compliance (Mackinson et al, 2011;Kraak et al, 2013). The difficulties encountered by the North Sea RAC in extending their sense of ownership of the emerging Nephrops management plan to the wider stakeholder community of active fishers is a concern that will need to be addressed when developing such participatory practices.…”

“…An impact assessment is needed before a management-plan proposal can become EU legislation, and DG MARE requests advice on such assessments from ICES and/or STECF. Stakeholder involvement in the development and evaluation processes has generally been limited (Wilson, 2009a;Simmonds et al, 2011;Kraak et al, 2013). An exception was a long-term management plan for western horse mackerel which emerged in 2006-07 as an initiative of the Pelagic Regional Advisory Council (Pelagic RAC) (Clarke et al, 2007;Hegland and Wilson, 2009) 2015.…”

“…These studies provide unique insights into a new phenomenon in EU fishery governance, in which Advisory Councils take on tasks beyond their traditional reactive, consultative role. The consultative role has sometimes been a frustrating one: The feeling of possessing relevant information, but not being listened to, is a reoccurring topic in the analysis of stakeholder-manager relations, as illustrated in the context of developing and implementing a recovery plan for cod in the North Sea (Wilson, 2009a;Kraak et al, 2013). In another example, Linke and Jentoft (2014) Commission would typically be met with criticism from the industry, whereas the industry did not themselves contribute alternative proposals (Lado, 2016, p. 253).…”

“…The initiative to make such plans would normally come from DG MARE. Limited stakeholder involvement in these processes has generated a sense within the fishing industry that management plans represent 'top-down' management instruments imposed on them 'from Brussels', resulting in limited support from the fishers (Kraak et al, 2013;Wilson, 2009a). The North Sea RAC initiative to develop a management plan for Nephrops fisheries, which is analysed here, exemplifies a different and non-standard approach: a 'bottom up' process in which the stakeholders are in the driving seat while other actors (scientists and bureaucrats) are invited into their process to contribute with relevant knowledge.…”