Lessons and new directions for extended cognition from social and personality psychology

Skorburg, Joshua August

doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1282606

Cited by 10 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 69 publications

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“…Mark Alfano and Joshua August Skorburg (Alfano 2013, pp. 111-139;Skorburg 2017;Alfano & Skorburg 2016) have raised a situationist challenge to virtue theory. The situationist objection stresses the weakness of virtues by showing how easily an agent is influenced by contextual features.…”

Section: Virtue Epistemology On Epistemic Emotionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Emotions and Co-inquiry: A Situated Approach

Candiotto

2022

Topoi

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This paper discusses the virtue epistemology literature on epistemic emotions and challenges the individualist, unworldly account of epistemic emotions. It argues that epistemic emotions can be truth-motivating if embedded in co-inquiry epistemic cultures, namely virtuous epistemic cultures that valorise participatory processes of inquiry as truth-conducive. Co-inquiry epistemic cultures are seen as playing a constitutive role in shaping, developing, and regulating epistemic emotions. Using key references to classical Pragmatism, the paper describes the bridge between epistemic emotions and co-inquiry culture in terms of habits of co-inquiry that act as the scaffolding of epistemic emotions. The result is a context-sensitive and practice-oriented approach to epistemic emotions that conceives of those emotions as being shaped by co-inquiry epistemic cultures.

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Section: Virtue Epistemology On Epistemic Emotionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Emotions and Co-inquiry: A Situated Approach

Candiotto

2022

Topoi

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“…They might respond that the feedback loops between biased minds and unjust social structures are “imbalanced”, “unidirectional”, or “exploitative” and so don’t count as realizing extended cognition proper (Skorburg, 2017 ). But this response only works well if we focus on the targets of such structures, i.e., people negatively affected by and largely powerless against them.…”

Section: The Metaphysics and Ethics Of Implicit Bias Collidementioning

confidence: 99%

Extended Implicit Bias: When the Metaphysics and Ethics of Implicit Bias Collide

Peters

2022

Erkenn

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It has recently been argued that to tackle social injustice, implicit biases and unjust social structures should be targeted equally because they sustain and ontologically overlap with each other. Here I develop this thought further by relating it to the hypothesis of extended cognition. I argue that if we accept common conditions for extended cognition then people’s implicit biases are often partly realized by and so extended into unjust social structures. This supports the view that we should counteract psychological and social contributors to injustice equally. But it also has a significant downside. If unjust social structures are part of people’s minds then dismantling these structures becomes more difficult than it currently is, as this will then require us to overcome widely accepted ethical and legal barriers protecting people’s bodily and personal integrity. Thus, while there are good grounds to believe that people’s biases and unjust social structures ontologically overlap, there are also strong ethical reasons to reject this view. Metaphysical and ethical intuitions about implicit bias hence collide in an important way.

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“…And, in turn, well structured deliberation can effectively debias the thinking of individuals. This is the sort of positive feedback loop that becomes more visible from an interactionist point of view (Skorburg 2017: 465). And once visible, these feedback loops are more likely to be productively harnessed.…”

Section: Problems For Collectivistsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Mark Alfano and Joshua August Skorburg have recently argued for the use of an interactionist framework for bringing psychological research to bear on questions in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind (Alfano 2016; Skorburg 2017; Skorburg and Alfano 2019). The purpose of this paper is to argue that epistemic programmes dedicated to ameliorating the problem of cognitive bias should be developed and assessed within such an interactionist framework.…”

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confidence: 99%

An Interactionist Approach to Cognitive Debiasing

Bland¹

2020

Episteme

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This paper examines three programmatic responses to the problem of cognitive bias: virtue epistemology, epistemic paternalism, and epistemic collectivism. Each of these programmes focuses on a single level of epistemic analysis: virtue theorists on individuals, paternalists on environments, and collectivists on groups. I argue that this is a mistake in light of the fact that cognitive biases arise from interactions between these three domains. Consequently, epistemologists should spend less time defending these programmes, and more time coordinating them. This paper offers empirically based arguments for the interactionist approach, and contends that its adoption is an essential step for minimizing bias in empirical science.

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Lessons and new directions for extended cognition from social and personality psychology

Cited by 10 publications

References 69 publications

Epistemic Emotions and Co-inquiry: A Situated Approach

Epistemic Emotions and Co-inquiry: A Situated Approach

Extended Implicit Bias: When the Metaphysics and Ethics of Implicit Bias Collide

An Interactionist Approach to Cognitive Debiasing

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