Les résultats et les limites du tripartisme statutaire et non statutaire dans le secteur minier sud-africain

Hermanus, M.; Phakathi, Sizwe Timothy; Coulson, Nancy; Stewart, Paul

doi:10.4000/poldev.3008

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…However weaknesses in the tripartite project have emerged at the national level, which demands a closer examination of what is contributing to the reported OHS improvements. At the national level, the statutory tripartite Mine Health and Safety Council (required under the MHSA) under the leadership of the MHSI has confronted OHS risk within the parameters of existing mining approaches and has shied away from a more strategic examination of new types of efficiencies, technology and method change that significantly shift the production process and OHS risk (Hermanus et al, 2018). This study found this to be mirrored at the mine site level too.…”

Section: The Tripartite Projectmentioning

confidence: 81%

“…The UHSS offered no critique of management production practices when faced with a section 54 imposed by the MHSI. Neither has the Council provided any critical analysis of what may be contributing to the reported improvements outside OHS practice, such as that provided by Hermanus et al, who argue that it is the contraction of the gold sector that is making for substantive improvements (Hermanus et al, 2018). This article speaks to a schism in the pluralist arrangements between the employer and worker representatives for OHS at the mine operation which would suggest that the potential contribution of HSRs to OHS outcomes has been sullied.…”

Section: The Tripartite Projectmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Mine fatalities were at a record low in 2016 (Department of Mineral Resources, 2017) and the formal South African mining sector is shown by industry to perform on a par with other benchmark mining nations, such as Canada and the USA (Phakathi, 2016). Hermanus et al (2018) argue that this dramatic improvement in safety statistics is, however, not down to substantive improvement in OHS work practice alone, but that the concurrent drop in mineworkers employed in the gold sector has made for the significant difference (Hermanus et al, 2018). The gold sector even today has the highest fatality rate of all the South African mining commodities (Department of Mineral Resources, 2017: 16).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How worker health and safety representatives are captured and outdone by production on South African mines

Coulson

Christofides

2019

Economic and Industrial Democracy

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In South Africa, post-apartheid, under the Mine Health and Safety Act No. 29 of 1996, workers elect health and safety representatives (HSRs). Descriptive case studies were conducted at four underground mine sites (gold, platinum and diamond) to explore the relationship between employer safety management and HSRs. A systems approach (socio-autopoiesis) is used as a metaphor for the circular/closed communication that ensured HSRs were dominated by employer interests and let down by the regulator. The stance of the employer to worker representation has not significantly changed since the managerial self-regulation prevalent in the demise of apartheid years. Given union membership is high, the capacity of HSRs to act without reference to management is uniquely compromised and presents as an anomaly in studies of worker representatives worldwide.

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Section: The Tripartite Projectmentioning

confidence: 81%

Section: The Tripartite Projectmentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How worker health and safety representatives are captured and outdone by production on South African mines

Coulson

Christofides

2019

Economic and Industrial Democracy

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“…29 of 1996(Republic of South Africa, 1996 meant that, for the first time, there were legal OHS provisions in place that required consultation between representatives of the state, all trade unions, and the mining industry. These provisions finally complied with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, of which South Africa had been a signatory in 1919 (Hermanus et al, 2019) regarding Occupational Health and Safety (Convention 155) (ILO, 1981) and Safety in Mining (Convention 176) (ILO, 1995). At the time, this represented a shift from historical legacies and was a significant victory for the NUM.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communication constraints in the safety system on South African mines and implications for the exercise of the Right to Refuse Dangerous Work

Coulson,

Stewart

2024

J. S. Afr. Inst. Min. Metall.

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The Mine Health and Safety Act No. 29 of 1996, as amended, embeds an occupational health and safety management system that facilitates communication between representatives of the state, capital, and labour. In underground mines, two communication loops between these role players serve to separate the production chain of command from the political tripartite relations. Worker-elected health and safety representatives are involved in both communication loops, but are severely constrained in escalating their occupational health and safety concerns to the legal-political level. This has a direct bearing on the exercise of the Right to Refuse Dangerous Work (RRDW). As previously reported, health and safety representatives were found to primarily consult their production supervisors in preference to their trade-union representatives. This follow-up article presents production supervisor perspectives on the RRDW. The study demonstrates how, for mineworkers, the two distinct communication subsystems constrain, rather than facilitate, implementation of the RRDW.

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Safety and health before and after Marikana: subcontracting, illegal mining and trade union rivalry in the South African mining industry

Stewart

Bezuidenhout

Bischoff

2020

Review of African Political Economy

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Mine and worker Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) remains crucial given the historically dismal record of fatalities and accidents in mining in South Africa. OHS also played a central role in the resurgence of trade unionism of black South African mineworkers in the 1980s. While the OHS literature has the workplace as its predominant focus, this article explores three factors relating to conditions external to and beyond mining production: subcontracting, illegal mining and inter-union rivalry. By drawing on empirical studies conducted over two decades, employing a range of research methodologies, the article shows how these factors impact negatively on the mechanisms regulating safety and occupational health. The article concludes that understanding the OHS environment cannot remain restricted to the underground mining workplace. Instead, it points to a broader conceptualisation of OHS and notes the implications for worker politics and progressive research practice.

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Les résultats et les limites du tripartisme statutaire et non statutaire dans le secteur minier sud-africain

Cited by 3 publications

References 14 publications

How worker health and safety representatives are captured and outdone by production on South African mines

How worker health and safety representatives are captured and outdone by production on South African mines

Communication constraints in the safety system on South African mines and implications for the exercise of the Right to Refuse Dangerous Work

Safety and health before and after Marikana: subcontracting, illegal mining and trade union rivalry in the South African mining industry

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