Les banques du secteur coopératif allemand sont-elles construites sur un avantage comparatif déclinant ?

Kotz, Hans-Helmut; Nagel, Joachim H.

doi:10.3406/ecofi.2002.3573

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…In this regard, the large fixed costs related to the branch networks and the traditions of employee involvement and job security could pose particular challenges. Further consolidation and integration are seen as necessary by many within the sector (for the case of Germany, for example, see Kotz and Nagel, 2002), not in the least to improve cooperatives' ability to adopt new technologies. However, past experience shows that, in the process, important comparative advantages may be lost, in particular the closeness to customers that was the driving force of cooperatives' success in the past.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, employees receive a higher share of profits as compensation, which gives them an incentive to improve profitability. Kotz and Nagel (2002) find that, as the banking sector has become increasingly competitive, German cooperative banks have lost market shares and seen their profitability and efficiency decline. Nevertheless, they still have high interest margins and returns on assets compared to other types of banks in Germany.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Cooperative Banks in Europe: Policy Issues

2007

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This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. This paper explains the continuing success of European cooperative banks through evolving comparative advantages. It points out that a cooperative is built around an intergenerational endowment without final owners, which creates particular governance challenges. Risks include the use of the endowment for purposes other than members' best interest, such as empire-building, and attempts at appropriation. The risk of empire-building is reinforced by mechanisms that foster capital accumulation and asymmetric opportunities for consolidation. The paper concludes that some form of independent external oversight of corporate governance is warranted and that cooperatives need mechanisms enabling them to better manage their capital.

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Cooperative Banks in Europe: Policy Issues

2007

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“…By doing so, it favored the development of regional central unions and auditing organizations (Guinnane ). Lastly, financial cooperatives were organized in networks linked through those two types of regional organizations (Guinnane ; Kotz and Nagel ). This corresponds to the last design principle, whereby ‘among long‐enduring self‐governed regimes, smaller‐scale organizations tend to be nested in ever larger organizations’ (Ostrom , p. 13).…”

Section: Empirical Demonstrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Cooperative Finance as a New Common

Périlleux

Nyssens

2017

Ann Public Coop Econ

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The emerging field of common good socio-economics is promising not only for the preservation of common natural resources but also for common goods created by people through collective action, the importance of which has been emphasized by the recent financial and economic crisis. Based on the case of cooperative finance, this paper's outcomes are twofold. First, it shows that while the boundaries between the nature and property regime of goods may be relatively clear for natural common goods, they appear much more interlinked for human-made goods, where commons are embedded in intergenerational reciprocity. Second, it demonstrates that financial cooperatives can be understood as human-made commons and proposes a new way of thinking about public policies to design adequate legislation to protect these commons from isomorphism, privatization and destruction.2 Demutualization occurs when cooperative financial institutions are converted into stock companies, through the sale of 100% of the shares to depositors and insiders as part of an initial public offer.

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“…However, their "open-coop" structure helped collect savings from wealthier people who would have been reluctant to become FC members (Emmons and Mueller, 1997). In order to preserve their social capital and informational advantages, German FCs limited membership to small communities (Kotz and Nagel, 2002). In Germany, savings were mostly short-term but not demandable.…”

Section: Experience Of the 19th-century German Fcsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regional centrals had objectives such as facilitating the liquidity management of local FCs, smoothing seasonal fl uctuations, acting as a "lender of last resort," and helping FCs fi nd outlets for investment (Guinnane, 1997;Kotz and Nagel, 2002). Regional centrals had objectives such as facilitating the liquidity management of local FCs, smoothing seasonal fl uctuations, acting as a "lender of last resort," and helping FCs fi nd outlets for investment (Guinnane, 1997;Kotz and Nagel, 2002).…”

Section: Experience Of the 19th-century German Fcsmentioning

confidence: 99%