Leo Strauss's Confrontation with Max Weber: A Search for a Genuine Social Science

Abstract

An analysis of Leo Strauss's difficult and relatively neglected criticism of Max Weber in Natural Right and History reveals the fundamental difficulties that political science, and social science more generally, must overcome in order to be a genuine science. In Strauss's view, the inadequacy of the fact-value distinction, which is now widely acknowledged, compels a re-examination of Weber's denial of the possibility of valid knowledge of values. Strauss identifies the serious ground of this denial as Weber's insight that modern philosophy or science cannot refute religion. Believing that philosophy or science cannot ultimately give an account of itself that meets the challenge of religion, Weber maintained a “tragic” view of the human situation. Strauss also expresses profound doubt about the possibility of philosophy or science, but ultimately he suggests that a certain kind of study of the history of political philosophy might resolve the conflict between philosophy and divine revelation, and, therewith, the “value problem.”

Max Weber and his conservative critics: Social science and the problem of value relativism

“…As already noted, they argued that Weber’s irrationalism amounts to nihilism, in the sense that it undermines the very possibility of genuine belief in any value ideal, including those to which Weber was himself passionately attached. The critics also claimed that his position involves internal contradictions: for example, his argument for value neutrality is itself not value neutral, and therefore (it was claimed) rules itself out (see, for instance, Behnegar, 2003: 110, 1997). Similarly, if all perspectives on the world are based on fundamental value choices which are irrational, then this must be true of science itself.…”

As bases da ciência social weberiana e a interpretação crítica de Leo Strauss

“…No entanto, Strauss procurou mostrar que o relativismo não leva necessariamente à tolerância, pelo contrário, ao insurgir-se contra todo absolutismo ele transforma-se também em dogmatismo, rechaçando a priori qualquer tentativa contrária à premissa relativista. Na concepção de Strauss, o relativismo representava para o mundo contemporâneo um mal maior que o absolutismo, portanto, suas críticas mais árduas são endereçadas a ele, diz Behnegar (1997). Contudo, sua intenção é libertar o pensamento de ambas as formas de dogmatismo, propondo um retorno ao ceticismo clássico -o racionalismo zeetético (investigativo) -presente no pensamento grego pelo menos desde a máxima socrática "só sei que nada sei".…”

On the relationships between social theory and natural law: lessons from Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss

“…But the development of modern social theory since the end of the 19th century does not signal an unequivocal path in this direction; rather, it is best depicted as the recurrent critique of previous ideas of natural law as we mentioned in section I above. 11 Strauss actually sought to reassess the terms under which this social scientific critique of natural law took place via a reading of Weber; whom he regards as 'the greatest social scientist of our century' (Strauss, 1974: 36) even though Weber's sociology is duly read as in radical contradiction to ideas of natural law or right (Behnegar, 1997). Strauss locates Weber within the confines of the German historical school but aptly concludes that Weber departs from the conclusions of that school not because it 'had blurred the idea of natural right but because it had preserved natural right in an historical guise, instead of rejecting it altogether' (Strauss, 1974: 37).…”