Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics

Behnegar, Nasser

doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226821160.001.0001

Cited by 11 publications

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“…As already noted, they argued that Weber's irrationalism amounts to nihilism, in the sense that it undermines the very possibility of genuine belief in any value ideal, including those to which Weber was himself passionately attached. The critics also claimed that his position involves internal contradictions: for example, his argument for value neutrality is itself not value neutral, and therefore (it was claimed) rules itself out (see, for instance, Behnegar, 2003Behnegar, : 110, 1997. Similarly, if all perspectives on the world are based on fundamental value choices which are irrational, then this must be true of science itself.…”

Section: Conservative Criticism Of Webermentioning

confidence: 99%

Max Weber and his conservative critics: Social science and the problem of value relativism

Hammersley

2022

Journal of Classical Sociology

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In this paper some fundamental criticisms of Max Weber’s conception of the vocation of science are addressed. These well-known criticisms focus on his admission that science cannot demonstrate its own value, and his broader claim that there can be no rational basis for committing oneself to one set of ultimate values as against another. Instead, he insisted that the adoption of such values is necessarily a matter of individual decision. Influential critics have argued that this amounts to relativism, or even nihilism: that, if it were true, neither science nor anything else could have genuine value, all value-judgements would be arbitrary or entirely instrumental (e.g. a matter of self-interest). I will outline Weber’s position, and then examine the arguments of some of his critics: focussing particularly on Midgley and Strauss. This provides the basis for a careful reassessment of Weber’s position, and for some suggestions about how he could respond to these critics. It is argued that fundamental values operate in a dialectical relationship with specific evaluations, and that they arise naturally out of more or less universal features of human beings’ life experience. While this does not provide a compelling rational basis for commitment to those values, even less for prioritising one over another, it tells us why we often feel a need to uphold them. Furthermore, despite the fact that it does not guarantee agreement, rational clarification of these values and their implications, as well as appraisal of their relative significance in particular cases, is possible.

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Section: Conservative Criticism Of Webermentioning

confidence: 99%

Max Weber and his conservative critics: Social science and the problem of value relativism

Hammersley

2022

Journal of Classical Sociology

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“…Abbott seems to attach them to a monist view, but I will later show that they could usefully contribute to a dualist approach.5 Nor could we assume that a dialogue between sociologists and political philosophers would remedy the situation, given that sociologists are at least as divided in their political orientations. 6 Furthermore, Strauss rejected modern social science (seeBehnegar, 2003) so that, on the face of it, there is little scope for interdisciplinary collaboration in this case. 7 See Turner, 2008 on Oakeshott's conservatism.…”

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confidence: 99%

Should Sociology be Normative?

Hammersley

2023

Am Soc

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This article critically examines recent arguments by Andrew Abbott, Jensen Sass, and Tariq Modood proposing a normative sociology, one that not only adopts an evaluative stance towards the phenomena it investigates, but also makes explicit and seeks to justify the values on which its evaluations rely. I argue that, while these proposals are to be welcomed in some respects, they fail to address two key issues: On what reasonable basis can it be assumed that there are single correct answers to value questions?; and What distinctive intellectual authority can sociologists claim to be able to discover those answers? I also point out that these recent advocates for a normative sociology pay insufficient attention to the opposing position, a commitment to ‘value-neutrality’, as proposed most notably by Max Weber. I argue that, while this is frequently ignored or dismissed out of hand, it represents a much more coherent and cogent view, even if its advocates have rarely fully lived up to its demands.

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The Mayberry Machiavellians In Power: A Critical Analysis of the Bush Administration through a Synthesis of Machiavelli, Goffman, and Foucault

Paolucci¹,

Holland²,

Williams³

Current Perspectives in Social Theory

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Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics

Cited by 11 publications

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Max Weber and his conservative critics: Social science and the problem of value relativism

Max Weber and his conservative critics: Social science and the problem of value relativism

Should Sociology be Normative?

The Mayberry Machiavellians In Power: A Critical Analysis of the Bush Administration through a Synthesis of Machiavelli, Goffman, and Foucault

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