2007
DOI: 10.1007/s11187-007-9053-2
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Lending to small businesses: the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems

Abstract: Loan maturity, Collateral, Small businesses, Relationship lending, G21, G32, L26,

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Cited by 204 publications
(131 citation statements)
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References 56 publications
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“…The result is the same as that found by Ortiz- Molina and Penas (2008), because the fixed assets are not appropriate for short-term loan guarantee (cited in Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos 2015). Amidu (2007) also finds this negative relationship between short-term debt and tangible assets, in Ghana.…”
Section: Capital Structure Determinants Of Large-listed Firmssupporting
confidence: 77%
“…The result is the same as that found by Ortiz- Molina and Penas (2008), because the fixed assets are not appropriate for short-term loan guarantee (cited in Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos 2015). Amidu (2007) also finds this negative relationship between short-term debt and tangible assets, in Ghana.…”
Section: Capital Structure Determinants Of Large-listed Firmssupporting
confidence: 77%
“…With respect to the first group of firm-specific factors, we examine four inverse proxies for information asymmetry: Size (number of full-time employees), Age (number of years the firm has been operating), Audit (1 if external auditors check the firm financial statement, and 0 otherwise) (Berger, Udell 2002;Chakraborty, Hu 2006;Ortiz-Molina, Penas 2008;Menkhoff et al 2012;Duarte et al 2017). By following the related studies, we also consider firm size, age, audit report as inverse proxies for information opacity, and expect to find a negative association with collateral.…”
Section: Independent Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Major owners, such as families in the context of SMEs, have two important effects on the nature of the banking relationship. On the one hand, as mentioned by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983b), Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2007) and Andres (2008), among others, in assuming a supervisory role, major owners significantly reduce information asymmetries and agency costs, facilitating an increase in the number of banking relationships. On the other hand, when these owners supply personal collateral, this facilitates new banking relationships (Ono andUesugi, 2009, Steijvers andVoordeckers, 2009).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%