Leibniz on Plurality, Dependence, and Unity

Harmer, Adam

doi:10.11612/resphil.1614

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Introduction1

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2020

2021

Publication Types

Select...

Article2

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent2

Authors

Journals

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…3. ForfurtherdiscussionoftheroleofthePluralityThesisinLeibniz'sArgumentfromUnity, includinghowLeibniz'sArgumentfromUnityisvulnerabletoobjectionsstemmingfromcertain typesofmonism,see,e.g., Harmer(2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Discreteness of Matter: Leibniz on Plurality and Part-Whole Priority

Harmer

2021

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Leibniz argues against Descartes’s conception of material substance based on considerations of unity. I examine a key premise of Leibniz’s argument, what I call the Plurality Thesis—the claim that matter (i.e., extension alone) is a plurality of parts. More specifically, I engage an objection to the Plurality Thesis stemming from what I call Material Monism—the claim that the physical world is a single material substance. I argue that Leibniz can productively engage this objection based on his view that matter is discrete. The discreteness of matter provides two aspects of support for the Plurality Thesis. First, it indicates that the parts of matter do not share boundaries and are, therefore, independent in an important sense. Second, it indicates that the parts of matter are determinate and are, therefore, ontologically prior to the wholes they compose.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%