Leibniz on Causation – Part 1

Abstract

Leibniz holds that created substances do not causally interact with each other but that there is causal activity within each such creature. Every created substance constantly changes internally, and each of these changes is caused by the substance itself or by its prior states. Leibniz describes this kind of intrasubstance causation both in terms of final causation and in terms of efficient causation. How exactly this works, however, is highly controversial. I will identify what I take to be the major interpretive issues surrounding Leibniz's views on causation and examine several inf luential interpretations of these views. In 'Leibniz on Causation -Part 2' I will then take a closer look at final causation.

Leibniz’ prästabilierte Harmonie neu betrachtet

“…as formal and final causes), the particular state God produces in them. In favour of seeing creaturely causation as both efficient and formal/final causation are Adams (1994: 309-14); Rutherford (2005, 166); Carlin (2006: 231), and Jorati (2015a). A more radical view is defended by Jonathan Bennett, for whom efficient causation is the only type of causation that, according to Leibniz, should Reconsider the passage from IN § 6 which I quoted towards the middle of the previous paragraph.…”

“…On the side of perception are McRae (1976: 47); Kulstad (1993a: 96); Jolley (1998: 591-611); Futch (2008: 168); Jorgensen (2019: 101-06). On neither of these sides are Bobro/Clatterbaugh 1996, 408-425 andJorati 2015a, who think that a substance's changes can only be brought about by the substance itself, rather than by its states, however one may wish to construe them. Lodge (1998: 294, n. 9) For a recent and more detailed defence of this idea, see Schepers (2018).…”

Leibniz’s Lost Argument Against Causal Interaction

“…See, e.g., Mates (1986: 206), Adams (1994: 97), Jolley (1998: 605), Bennett (2001: 242, 270), Carlin (2006: 231ff. ), McDonough (2007;2008), and Jorati (2015). A few commentators deny this.…”