Leibniz’ Metaphysik der Modalität

Bender, Sebastian

doi:10.1515/9783110454949

Cited by 3 publications

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“…Metaphysical necessity is weaker than logical necessity but stronger than physical necessity. On Leibniz's notion of modality, see also important works by Poser (1969: 436-51) and ( 2016); on modality see also Nachtomy (2011) andBender (2016…”

Section: First-order Coherence and Modalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imaginative Animals. Leibniz's Logic of Imagination

Oliveri¹

2021

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Through the reconstruction of Leibniz's theory of the degrees of knowledge, this e-book investigates and explores the intrinsic relationship of imagination with space and time. The inquiry into this relationship defines the logic of imagination that characterizes both human and non-human animals, albeit differently, making them two different species of imaginative animals. Lucia Oliveri explains how the emergence of language in human animals goes hand in hand with the emergence of thought and a different form of rationality constituted by logical inferences based on identity and contradiction, principles that are out of reach of the imagination. The e-book concludes that the presence of innate principles in human animals transforms the way in which they sense-perceive the world, thereby constantly increasing the distinction between human and non-human animals.

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Section: First-order Coherence and Modalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imaginative Animals. Leibniz's Logic of Imagination

Oliveri¹

2021

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In Leibniz’s Wake: Rationalist Paradise Lost

Stratmann

2022

Can. J. of Philosophy

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The eighteenth-century German rationalist tradition is, broadly speaking, committed to (what I call) ‘the principle of rational cognition’: the grounded must be rationally cognizable from its sufficient ground. Whereas the prevailing view takes the fundamental challenge to rationalist paradise to stem from the principle of sufficient reason, I argue that it instead stems from this principle: How is it possible to rationally cognize anything at all from its ground? By investigating the opposing responses of two of Leibniz’s most influential immediate successors, Christian Wolff and Christian Crusius, we find no easy way to remain in rationalist paradise.

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Why God Thinks what He is Thinking? An Argument against Samuel Newlands’ Brute–Fact–Theory of Divine Ideas in Leibniz’s Metaphysics

Propach

2021

EJPR

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According to the most prominent principle of early modern rationalists, the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR], there are no brute facts, hence, there are no facts without any explanation. Contrary to the PSR, some philosophers have argued that divine ideas are brute facts within Leibniz’s metaphysics. In this paper, I argue against brute-fact-theories of divine ideas, especially represented by Samuel Newlands in Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility, and elaborate an alternative Leibnizian theory of divine ideas.

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Leibniz’ Metaphysik der Modalität

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Imaginative Animals. Leibniz's Logic of Imagination

Imaginative Animals. Leibniz's Logic of Imagination

In Leibniz’s Wake: Rationalist Paradise Lost

Why God Thinks what He is Thinking? An Argument against Samuel Newlands’ Brute–Fact–Theory of Divine Ideas in Leibniz’s Metaphysics

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