Legitimate Authority in War

Abstract

The requirement of legitimate authority—according to which ‘the right of initiating war in a state lies with the sovereign’—was originally introduced in the writings of Augustine, Aquinas, and Pufendorf. This chapter offers a detailed account of the Requirement as it should be understood and an articulation of the moral conviction that underlies it. The chapter then defends the Requirement by addressing the main objection to it: wars are just in virtue of their intrinsic features; it does not matter who fights them. In response to this objection, this chapter shows that Joseph Raz’s ‘normal justification thesis’ supports conferring authority to veto wars on two (usually overlapping) collectives: those on whose behalf the war is fought and those who will bear its costs. The chapter further advances a proceduralist justification of the Requirement arguing that violating it compromises the ideal of fair political participation.

Legitimate Authority in Forceful Resistance and the Consent Requirement

“…In recent debates about legitimate authority in domestic insurgency, several theorists (Benbaji 2018; Finlay 2010; Parry 2017; Valls 2000; Walzer 1977) argued that to justify the use of force, the insurgents must obtain the consent of the victims on whose behalf resistance is undertaken. There are two interpretations of this consent requirement.…”

“…3 According to the Popular Support Thesis, a veto from the victims is not simply one factor against forceful resistance to be weighed against other reasons for such resistance. Instead, it is preemptive, making fighting the war unjustifiable (Benbaji 2018, 302). There are at least three defenses for the Popular Support Thesis: first, the aggregate judgments of the victims can better track the justice of forceful resistance; second, many resistance movements claim to represent a larger group of victims; third, given the contingency and unpredictability of the outcomes of forceful resistance, it is reasonable to defer to the prevailing opinion of the victims.…”

“…(b) Proportionality : the alleged beneficiaries of forceful resistance are often in a better position to judge the value of the cause being pursued, so a lack of support from these individuals may suggest that political violence is not proportionate. (c) Necessity : because the victims will bear the costs of forceful resistance (which are sometimes very high), they have a strong incentive to pursue peaceful means of resistance and to veto any unnecessary violence (Benbaji 2018, 304–305). 4 In short, victims’ “aggregate judgement about their own interests indirectly track[s] justice better than the politicians and military leaders who directly assess the justice of the war” (Benbaji 2018, 305).…”

Just war and the question of authority

“…1 Writing in 2018, this claim can no longer be maintained. Rather, it seems that the authority criterion has moved to the forefront of debate as a host of publications on the question indicates (cf., e. g., Benbaji 2018;Fabre 2008Fabre , 2012Finlay 2010;Kutz 2005;Parry 2015Parry , 2017Reitberger 2013;Schwenkenbecher 2013;Steinhoff 2007;Wrange 2017). Interestingly, the revived interest in authority has returned philosophical attention to the principle classical just war thinkers such as St Thomas Aquinas considered to be the most important of all.…”

Revolution and Intervention

“…The view defended here is of course premised on the rejection of Kant's idea that the only body capable of acting on behalf of a political community is its government (Flikschuh ; Korsgaard , 254; Ripstein, 336; see also, Smith ). Insightful discussions of how the notion of authorization operates in this context are Finlay ; Lazar ; Benbaji .…”