Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics

Abstract

What motivates states to follow international norms, rules, and commitments? All social systems must confront what we might call the problem of social control—that is, how to get actors to comply with society's rules—but the problem is particularly acute for international relations, because the international social system does not possess an overarching center of political power to enforce rules. Yet, taken in balance with other values, a measure of order is a valued good. Some take this absence of centralized power to mean that the international system is like a Hobbesian state of nature, where only material power matters; others see it as evidence that international rules have force only when they are in the self-interest of each state. I show that these two conclusions are premature because of their shallow reading of international society and misinterpretation of the ways in which authority works in domestic society.

Theory of an Emerging-State Actor: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Case †

“…Or, calculated legitimacy lying between Coercion and legitimacy. The difference between Coercion and calculated legitimacy as described by Hurd: "is that an application of coercion leaves the coerced actor worse off than it was beforehand…whereas a self-interest perspective sees the actor as better off than it would be taking any other available path" [15] (p. 386). The in-between state more accurately captures some of the complex patronage relationships where out of purely self-interested ethnographic groups will temporarily align with the local power, but quickly remove that alignment if their interests diverge.…”

“…. whereas a self-interest perspective sees the actor as better off than it would be taking any other available path" [15] (p. 386). The in-between state more accurately captures some of the complex patronage relationships where out of purely self-interested ethnographic groups will temporarily align with the local power, but quickly remove that alignment if their interests diverge.…”

Theory of an Emerging-State Actor: the ISIS Case

“…Reasonable boundaries for proposed hypothesis can be selected through a "slicing approach" to complex systems as advocated by Saeed in 1992. [14] In complex systems modes of behavior can exist in time, geography (both a geography of 'terrain' and a geography of 'things'), and simultaneous modes. In this paper the complex system will be sliced as depicted in Table 1.…”

O Que Gestão Estratégica Tem a Ver com Capitalismo(s)?

“…A literatura de RI afirma que bases de legitimidade nacionais e regionais devem ser defendidas, preservadas e difundidas ou impostas internacionalmente segundo interesses nacionais ou regionais de ordem econômica e (geo)política (Clark, 2009). Estrategistas de Estado, juntamente com grandes corporações e, eventualmente, com o apoio da sociedade civil, devem mobilizar diferentes tipos de poder político, em especial por meio da combinação de coerção, cooptação e sedução (Hurd, 1999;Nye, 2008). Bases de legitimidade nacionais ou regionais classificadas como ameaçadoras devem ser legitimamente modificadas por meio de mecanismos de institucionalização que, venham a reforçar os privilégios dos conquistadores em relação aos conquistados (Hurrell, 2005).…”

“…xvii), a literatura de estudos internacionais entende legitimidade como um tipo especial de obediência ou dominação, que difere, por um lado, do comportamento instrumental ou autointeressado, e, por outro, "de regras coercitivas impostas diretamente ao outro" (Hurrell, 2005, p. 16). Legitimidade, portanto, não é simplesmente o que as pessoas tendem a aceitar sob uma perspectiva sociológica, vis-à-vis disfunções coletivas geradas pela racionalidade individual, como previsto por Max Weber, mas sim o que as pessoas aceitam "em função de algum entendimento normativo ou processo de persuasão" (Hurrell, 2005, p. 16 (Hurd, 1999).…”