Legislators as Taxicabs: On the Value of Seats in the U.S. House of Representatives

Crain, Mark; Deaton, Thomas H.; Tollison, Robert D.

doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1977.tb00475.x

Cited by 21 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Abrams and Settle (1978) examine the implications of restricting access to campaign funds. Crain and Tollison (1976) and Crain, Deaton, and Tollison (1977)attempt to measure the value of a legislative seat by examining factors that determine how much candidates will spend to obtain it. Jacobson (1980) and Welch (1980) examine the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes and policy decisions, respectively.…”

Section: Other Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions

Grier

Munger

1986

J Labor Res

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Legislators possess political assets that economic interest groups may find valuable in pursuing their goals. This paper examines the effect these legislative assets have on the campaign contributions made by two large and easily identifiable interest groups: corporations and labor unions. Committee assignment, voting record, and electoral security are significant predictors of both corporate and union contributions to House incumbents, while party affiliation and years in office also influence the behavior of union political action committees.

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Section: Other Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions

Grier

Munger

1986

J Labor Res

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“…The third set of findings is also related to work by , Crain, Deaton and Tollison (1977) and Abrams (1981) . Crain and Tollison and Abrams use measures of the "value of office" to explain variations in total campaign expenditures across state gubernatorial races, while Crain, Deaton and Tollison use such measures to explain variations over time in total campaign expenditures in races for the U.S. House (although, see Dunlevy and Yeager 1979 for a strong critique of their work). The logic underlying these studies is similar to the logic behind the expectation that in Senate races there should not be a relationship between investor contributions and variables such as population, income and education.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

The Market for Campaign Contributions: Evidence for the U.S. Senate 1980–1986*

Snyder

1993

Economics & Politics

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This paper tests a simple asset market model of campaign contributions, using data from recent U.S. Senate races. When applied to "investor" PACs, the model performs surprisingly well, and suggests that the contributions market is relatively efficient. When applied to "ideological" PACs, political parties, and individuals, the model is rejected. The results not only provide empirical support for the model, but also point out important differences in the apparent motives behind different types of contributions.

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“…1 , Crain, Tollison, Deaton, and Tollison (1977) and Gifford and Santoni (1978) find that campaign funding increases as the size of the public resources controlled increases. Additionally, Abrams (1981) shows that other measures of the ability to influence policy such as the power to appoint officials and finance with debt increase campaign 1 In addition to political influence and political resources, the ambitions of the individual politician may also impact campaign expenditures (Schlesinger, 1966).…”

Section: The Voter Initiative and The Power Of The Governor: Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures

Randolph

2011

Const Polit Econ

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Although a great deal of research examines the impact of the voter initiative process on the state legislature, the consequences for the state executive branch have been largely ignored. The voter initiative process provides the governor with a method to circumvent the legislature, which may increase the power of the governor in theory. However, it also provides citizens with a means to bypass the traditional lawmaking process and avoid the governor's veto. This may reduce the power of the governor and lead to policies farther from the preferences of the governor. This study examines the impact of the voter initiative process on the power of the state governor by estimating total election cycle spending. Campaign expenditures are expected to reflect any sustained gain or loss in power due to the availability of the voter initiative process. The results indicate that gubernatorial campaign expenditures are significantly lower in states in which the voter initiative process is available. This finding suggests that state governors sustain a loss in political power when the voter initiative is available. Additionally, the findings imply that individuals may employ the voter initiative process as a substitute for gubernatorial support.JEL Codes: H1, H7

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Legislators as Taxicabs: On the Value of Seats in the U.S. House of Representatives

Cited by 21 publications

References 1 publication

The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions

The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions

The Market for Campaign Contributions: Evidence for the U.S. Senate 1980–1986*

The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures

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